Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 40
Issue 1 Fall 2008

Article 6

2008

How Much Power Should Be in the Paw?
Independent Investigations and the Cat's Paw
Doctrine
Sara Eber
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sara Eber, How Much Power Should Be in the Paw? Independent Investigations and the Cat's Paw Doctrine, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 141 (2008).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol40/iss1/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Comment
How Much Power Should Be In the Paw?
Independent Investigations and the Cat's Paw
Doctrine
Sara Eber*
Every truth has two sides; it is as well to look at both, before we
commit ourselves to either.
-Aesop
I. INTRODUCTION

Lonnell Brewer, a graduate student at the University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign, found himself fired from his job because of a
parking pass.1 Brewer, who is black, parked his car in a certain lot at
the direction of his immediate supervisor, who allegedly harbored a
discriminatory bias toward him. 2 When news of Brewer's improper
parking reached his supervisor, Brewer was terminated without any
3
objective inquiry as to why he parked in the wrong lot.
4
Although it may seem like an episode fit for a primetime sitcom,
Brewer's plight more accurately reflects a growing issue in employment
law regarding the efficacy of independent investigations. 5 In a work
* J.D., Loyola University Chicago, expected May 2009.

I wish to thank my friends and

family for their support and patience during the writing and publication process. A special thank
you belongs to my parents for always encouraging my writing and motivating me in all of my
endeavors.
1. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 357 (2007).
2. Id. at 909-10.
3. Id. at913.
4. Judge Cudahy actually introduced this case as concerning "the corrupt, Machiavellian
world of permit parking at the University of Illinois's Urbana-Champaign campus, and the ill
fortune of a student who became involved in it." Id. at 909.
5. See generally Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law
After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 353, 370-71 (2008) (discussing a proemployer trend in the Supreme Court and the likelihood that the Court will adopt a relaxed
standard of what constitutes a causation-breaking activity); Recent Cases, Employment LawTitle VII-EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006),
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culture that increasingly relies on information from lower-level
employees who lack authority to make personnel decisions, antidiscrimination laws must make necessary adjustments as well, including
requiring employers to provide for adequate independent
6
investigations.
For example, the growing demand to increase the speed of
decisionmaking has prompted some employers to "flatten" their
workplace hierarchies. 7 This flattening process vests more power in
subordinate employees, allowing employers to make decisions without
in-person communication. 8 It is increasingly common for employment
decisions to be made by individuals or groups who do not personally
know the employees they are reviewing. Often, such decisionmakers
9
must rely on input from lower-level supervisors to make decisions.
This situation presents a problem in the context of employment
discrimination, where an employer is traditionally liable for the
discriminatory acts of a supervisory employee only if that employee has
authority to execute a tangible employment action, such as hiring,
firing, changing work assignments, or altering compensation. 10

cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007), 120 HARV. L. REV. 1699, 1706 (2007) (addressing problems
with merely asking an employee for his side of the story, as articulated by some courts).
6. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1, 2, 11-12 (2006); see also PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK 15, 24-26

(1997) (noting the changes in the modem workplace); Esther E. Klein, Using Information
Technology to Eliminate Layers of Bureaucracy,46 NAT'L PUB. ACCT. 46, 46 (2001) (explaining

that the demand of faster decisionmaking is influencing the organizational structures in the
workplace).
7. Klein, supra note 6, at 46-47.
8. Id. Most large employers now use multi-tiered employment structures comprised of
varying levels of supervisors and decisionmakers, each with different degrees of delegated
authority. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26-27, Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., No.
06-1694 (June 19, 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 357 (Oct. 1,2007) [hereinafter Brewer Petition].
9.

Brewer Petition, supra note 8, at 2-3; see also Phillip J. Fowler, Employment Cases and the

'Cat's Paw' Theory, CBA REC., Jan. 2008, at 44, 44 (stating that human resources personnel,
general counsel, and CEOs often make employment decisions based on recommendations from
subordinates); Posting of Helen Norton to ACSBIog, http://www.acsblog.org/economicregulation-employment-supreme-court-preview-rubber-stamp-firings-and-antidiscriminationlaw.html (Apr. 11, 2007, 12:30 EST) (noting that a decision about the liability of subordinate
employees would have great consequences "in a world where employers increasingly empower
upper-level personnel to make key decisions based on a subordinate's reports and
recommendations"). Examples of tangible adverse employment decisions include "hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing
a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
10. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790-91 (1998) ("A supervisory employee
who fires a subordinate is doing the kind of thing that he is authorized to do .... ") (emphasis
added) (quoting Shager v. Upjohn, 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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The Cat's Paw Doctrine

Thankfully, there are signs that employment discrimination laws have
adjusted to the changing dynamics of the workplace. 11 Nearly all
circuits recognize subordinate bias liability-sometimes referred to as
the "cat's paw doctrine"-where an employer may be liable for the
discriminatory animus of a non-decisionmaking employee. 12 Yet
simply providing a mechanism to theoretically hold an employer
accountable does not easily bring employment discrimination laws up to
speed with the realities of the American workplace. 13 Inevitably,
employers must decide4 to what extent these decisions are reviewed
before becoming final.'
Not only are thorough investigations sensible from a managementhuman resources perspective, 15 but they also provide employers with an
16
effective mechanism for avoiding costly discrimination lawsuits.
First, the savvy employer with an efficient grievance and investigation
procedure will discover potential claims before they become a problem,
lowering the risk that the claim will proceed to litigation. 17 Second, if
an employer finds itself involved in a lawsuit-particularly one dealing
with subordinate bias-the good faith investigation may help the
employer avoid liability in some circuits.18

11. Namely, the growth of the relatively new cat's paw doctrine, promulgated as recently as
1990 in Shager v. Upjohn. Shager, 913 F.2d 398. See also Part III.B (discussing EEOC v. BCI
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007),
cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007), a cat's paw case nearly heard by the Supreme Court
during its 2006-2007 Term).
12. Angelo J. Genova & Francis J. Vernoia, Litigating Employment Discrimination Claims
2007, in LITIGATION, at 9, 20-21 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No.
10836, 2007).
13. See Green, supra note 5, at 371-72 (discussing the possibility that even a seemingly
employee-friendly Supreme Court ruling may lack the necessary teeth to be effective).
14. See Human Resource-Civil Rights Risk Assessment, Internal Investigations I (May 1,
2007), http://www.hrcrra.conwhitepapers (follow "White Paper 6: Employee Investigations"
hyperlink) [hereinafter HRCRR, Internal Investigations] (advocating that employers should
"integrate" their investigations into their general process of monitoring their workforce).
15. See George J. Terwilliger, Internal Investigations, 30 NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 2007, at 12, 12
(discussing internal investigations as a strategic tool for corporations); HRCRR, Internal
Investigations, supra note 14, at I (advocating effective management through the use of prompt
and efficient investigations).
16. See HRCRR, Internal Investigations, supra note 14, at 2, 18 (a proper investigation could
be a significant tool in subsequent litigation). For example, a thorough, independent investigation
could be used as leverage in any settlement negotiations or during summary judgment.
17. Id. at 2. If conducted early enough, investigations can help an employer "rectify the
wrongdoing or to assure those in leadership positions that the charges are without merit." Id.
18. See generally infra Part ILI.B (discussing the Tenth Circuit's causation approach in EEOC
v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 852
(2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007)); Part IV.C (analyzing the merits of the causation
standard); Part V.A (arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt the causation approach when it
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Before fully examining why independent investigations will become

an increasingly important factor in employment law, it is necessary to
understand when a subordinate employee has sufficient authority that
his or her employer can be liable for the subordinate's discriminatory
20
actions. 19 Currently, the circuits vary widely on this question.
Several, including the Tenth Circuit, have allowed suits against

employers

to

proceed

when

non-decisionmaking

employees'

discriminatory behavior caused an adverse action. 2 1 Others, including
the Fourth 22 and Seventh Circuits, 23 hold that employers can never be

liable for discrimination by non-decisionmaking employees.

In its

2006-2007 term, the Supreme Court came very close to resolving this
issue in EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., but BCI withdrew the
case days before oral argument. 24 Now, the question of subordinate
liability remains and is increasingly relevant to the American

workplace.

25

This Comment argues that the United States Supreme Court should
consider a cat's paw case in the near future to resolve the split among
the circuits concerning the degree of influence a subordinate must have
over the decisionmaking process to trigger employer liability. 26 In so
doing, the Court should adopt the Tenth Circuit's causation-based

approach, holding an employer liable when a subordinate's animus
actually caused an adverse employment action. 27 Additionally, the
Court can encourage the use of independent investigations by allowing
employers to escape liability where they demonstrate reasonable efforts

rules on a cat's paw case).
19. See, e.g., HRCRR, Internal Investigations, supra note 14, at 18-19 (acknowledging the
cat's paw doctrine in the context of conducting independent investigations) (quoting BCI, 450
F.3d at 484-85); see generally BCI, 450 F.3d at 484-87 (discussing the cat's paw doctrine,
decisionmakers under Title VII, and the role of independent investigations).
20. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 20.
21. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006).
22. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004).
23. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
357 (2007).
24. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007). The BCI case had been
referred to as "the most anticipated case of the term." Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court's
2006-2007 Term Employment Law Cases: A Quiet but Revealing Term, II EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 219, 219 (2007).
25. Selmi, supra note 24, at 219.
26. See infra Part V.A (highlighting the importance of a resolution by the Supreme Court on
this issue).
27. See infra Part V.A (arguing that the causation standard provides the most reasonable
approach to addressing subordinate bias liability).
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to investigate claims of a subordinate's discriminatory bias. 28 This
approach serves the deterrent purposes of Title VII while providing a
29
clear opportunity for employers to avoid liability.
Part II of this Comment will begin by addressing the development of
the cat's paw doctrine, 30 its relationship to the broader employment
it
discrimination statute, Title VH of the Civil Rights Act,3 1 and how 32
may be used to impute the liability of a non-decisionmaking employee
to the employer. 3 3 Next, Part III will discuss the three general
approaches to analyzing subordinate bias liability through case
illustrations: 1) the input standard, 2) the causation standard, and 3) the
actual decisionmaker standard. 34 Part IV will then analyze the practical
and philosophical merits and disadvantages of each standard. 35 Finally,
Part V of this Comment suggests that the Supreme Court should
examine a subordinate bias liability case in the near future and adopt the
causation model as the appropriate standard, emphasizing the need for
employers to conduct truly independent investigations when
36
contemplating tangible employment decisions.

28. See infra Part V.B (discussing why the Supreme Court should adopt the causation model
and the importance of independent investigations).
29. Brief for Respondent at 32, BCI, 127 S. Ct. 852 (No. 06-341) [hereinafter Brief of EEOC]
(discussing the necessity of establishing causation based on the statutory language of Title VII).
30. See infra, Part Il.A (describing the development of the cat's paw doctrine by Judge Posner
in Shager v. Upjohn).
31. See infra, Part II.B (exploring the relevant statutory provisions of Title VII and significant
Supreme Court cases that bear on the subordinate bias liability debate).
32. In this article, "subordinate" will generally refer to an employee who, though often
standing in a position of authority, lacks the power to make tangible employment decisions, such
as hiring, firing, or compensation decisions.
33. See infra Part I.C (providing an explanation of how the cat's paw doctrine may be used in
employment discrimination cases, whether proceeding under the direct or indirect frameworks).
34. See infra Parts III.A, B, and C (describing the facts and analysis of Russell v. McKinney
Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2000), EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d
476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931
(2007), Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004), and Brewer
v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 357 (2007),
as models of the input, causation, and actual-decisionmaker standards respectively).
35. See infra Parts IV.A, B, and C (weighing the arguments in favor and in opposition to each
model).
36. See infra Parts V.A and B (advocating that there is a great need for the Supreme Court to
address this issue in the near future, and that the causation standard provides an appropriate
middle-ground to satisfy the needs of employers and employees, provided meaningful
independent investigations are demanded).
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II. BACKGROUND
The cat's paw

doctrine 37

serves as a guidepost for courts, aiding them

in determining when an employer should be liable for an adverse
employment decision that may have been "tainted by a biased
subordinate employee." 38 This Part will address the origins of the cat's
paw doctrine, 39 its relationship to the broader employment
discrimination statutes in Title VH, 4 0 and how it is used in litigation. 4 1
A. The Origins of the Cat's Paw Doctrine
The term "cat's paw," while a relatively new legal doctrine, comes
from a fable made famous by Jean de La Fontaine. 4 2 In the story, a
monkey induces a cat to scoop chestnuts from a fire, and as the cat
continuously reaches into the fire and burns his paw, the monkey eats
the chestnuts and leaves none for the cat. 4 3 In the context of
employment law, "'cat's paw' refers to a situation in which a biased
subordinate, who lacks decisionmaking power, uses the formal
decisionmaker as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a
discriminatory employment action." 44 A cat's paw relationship can
develop in a variety of circumstances, such as when a biased
subordinate conceals relevant information from a decisionmaker,
thereby manipulating an employment decision, or when the
subordinate's discriminatory animus skews recommendations to higher
45
authorities.

37. Courts frequently use the phrases "subordinate bias" liability or "rubber stamp" liability to
describe the cat's paw doctrine as well. BCI, 450 F.3d at 484. However, rubber stamp more
accurately refers to a situation where "a decisionmaker gives perfunctory approval for an adverse
employment action explicitly recommended by a biased subordinate." Id.
38. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 13.
39. See infra Part II.A (explaining the cat's paw fable and its development into a legal
doctrine).
40. See infra Part II.B (discussing how the cat's paw doctrine fits into the terms of Title VII
and past employment discrimination cases).
41. See infra Part II.C (noting that the cat's paw doctrine may be used to proceed under the
direct or indirect framework of proving discrimination).
42. BCI, 450 F.3d at 484; see also Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 19 (noting that the
moral of La Fontaine's fable is the "impetus for the legal doctrine known as the 'cat's paw"').
43. BCI, 450 F.3d at 484.
44. Id. (citing Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998)).
The court also described the term "cat's paw" generally as, "one used by another to accomplish
his purposes." Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED
354 (2002)).
45. Lust v. Sealy, 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004); Rebecca Hanner White & Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision

Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 512-13 (2001); see also Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235
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The Seventh Circuit first developed the cat's paw doctrine in Shager
v. Upjohn, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether a committee's firing decision was "tainted" by a supervisor's
age-based prejudice. 46 Shager, the plaintiff, worked as a seed sales
representative. 4 7 His supervisor recommended to the committee that
Shager be fired even though he exceeded sales goals. 4 8 Evidence
suggested that the supervisor exaggerated Shager's deficiencies and
"portray[ed] Shager's performance to the committee in the worst
possible light." 4 9 In an opinion written by Judge Posner, the court
found that if the committee merely "acted as the conduit of [the

supervisor's]

prejudice-his

cat's

paw-the

innocence

of

[the

50

committee's] members would not spare the company from liability."
Since Shager, most circuits have adopted some form of the cat's paw
doctrine, but they disagree about how much influence a biased
subordinate must have over an employment decision before an
employer is liable. 5 1 Some circuits utilize a more lenient standard,
requiring only that a plaintiff demonstrate that a biased employee may
have had "influence" or "leverage" over a decision. 52 Others adopt a

F.3d 219, 227-28 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that although the supervisor did not have the power to
make promotion decisions, he possessed the power to recommend candidates for promotion).
46. Shager v. Upjohn, 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Hill v. Lockheed Martin
Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 288 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Seventh Circuit
developed the cat's paw doctrine).
47. Shager, 913 F.2d at 399.
48. Id. at 400.
49. Id. at 400, 405. Shager, fifty years old, brought a case of age discrimination under the
ADEA against his former employer, for wrongful termination. Id. at 399. Shager outsold a
newer, younger representative despite the fact that the regional supervisor assigned Shager poor
quality farmland and the younger employee covered the richest seed market. Id. at 399-400.
Still, Shager's supervisor recommended to the Career Path Committee that Shager be fired, while
he excused the young employee's poor performance. Id. at 400. The Seventh Circuit found that
the supervisor's influence "may well have been decisive" in Shager's firing. Id. at 405.
50. Id. at 405; see EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006),
(noting that Judge Posner "inaugurat[ed]" the descriptor "cat's paw" for this category of claim),
cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007).
51. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 20; Marcia Coyle, High Court Scrutinizes Key Job
Bias Liability Case, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 9, 2007, at 1, 25.
52. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
jury could find that an employee with age-based animus contributed significantly to the plaintiff's.
termination and was therefore principally responsible); see also Douglas B. Lipsky, The
Expansion of the Subordinate Bias Liability Theory Under Title VI-The 'Cat's Paw' Grows
2007),
8,
(March
L.
ALERT
&
LAB.
EMP.
GIBBONS
Nails,
http://www.gibbonslaw.conmnews-publications/articles.php?action=display-publication&publica
tion-id=2116&practice_id=33 (finding that under the lenient standard, a plaintiff can avoid
summary judgment by showing that a biased subordinate provided information "that may have
affected the adverse employment decision").
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more strict approach, requiring that the subordinate be the "actual
decision maker" or one principally responsible for a decision in order
for an employer to be liable. 53 Still other circuits have found that a
middle-ground, causation-based standard is most appropriate, only
finding liability where traditional tort standards of causation are
54
satisfied.
Despite these differences, the common thread among all circuits is
that regardless of the degree of discriminatory action, if an employer
takes independent steps-or, in other words, conducts an independent
investigation-before reaching its decision, the employer will not be
held liable for a biased subordinate's acts. 55 The circuits are also in
general agreement in cases of obvious subordinate control. 56 Where the
degree of control by a subordinate is so great that the subordinate is in
essence the actual decisionmaker, even circuits adopting the strict
57
interpretation of the cat's paw doctrine will hold an employer liable.
Furthermore, in cases where the employer's acts are tantamount to a
"rubber stamp" of a subordinate's recommendation, courts consistently
58
find employers liable as well.
B. The Cat's Paw Doctrine'sRelationship to Title VII
Because the cat's paw doctrine serves as a mechanism to establish
employer liability for discriminatory acts, it derives its authority from
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 59 Title VII outlaws
53. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290 (4th Cir. 2004)
(holding that an employer will be liable for the acts of the "actual decisionmaker").
54. See BCI, 450 F.3d at 487 (finding that more than "mere 'influence' or 'input"' is needed
for employer liability and that the true issue is whether a subordinate's actions caused the
employment action); Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2004) (liability is
imputed to an employer where a discriminatory employee caused the ultimate injury).
55. See, e.g., BCI, 450 F.3d at 486 (noting that "an employer can escape liability entirely by
performing an independent investigation"); Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908,
921 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that it would be contrary to Title VII to hold the University liable
because the University investigated the issue), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 357 (2007); see also infra
Part V.B (discussing in detail independent investigations and their importance).
56. White & Krieger, supra note 45, at 512-13.
57. Hill, 354 F.3d at 291.
58. Id. at 290-91; see also Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226-27 (5th
Cir. 2000) (citing cases that stand for the proposition that if an employer rubber stamps an
employment decision, it will be held liable).
59. Because the cat's paw doctrine analyzes when liability can apply to discrimination not
sanctioned by the employer or authority figure, the scope of Title Vl's agency principles govern.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (defining "employer" as including "any agent"); see also Tim
Davis, Beyond the Cat's Paw: An Argument for Adopting a "Substantially Influences" Standard
for Title VII and ADEA Liability, 6 PIERCE L. REv. 247, 250-51 (2007) (discussing Title VII's
application to the cat's paw doctrine).
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employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 60 Congress designed Title VII to "encourage the
creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms." 6 1 The statute's terms provide a base for the debate
among the circuits regarding the extent to which a subordinate must
exercise control over a tangible employment action. 62 Specifically, the
statute provides that, "an unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors motivated the practice."63
Title Vil's use of the term, "because of," raises issues of common
64
law causation in the application of subordinate bias liability.
Although the Supreme Court has long utilized "but-for" and proximate
causation principles to limit liability in a variety of areas, 6 5 the role of
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (stating in pertinent part that it is unlawful for an employer
"to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual ...because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or to
limit, segregate, or classify" employees in a way that would deprive or adversely affect them on
account of the aforementioned classifications).
61. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
62. See generally EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 485 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quoting the language of Title VII to demonstrate that subordinate bias liability is consistent with
the principles promulgated in the statute), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 852 (2007), cert. dismissed,
127 S.Ct. 1931 (2007); Hill, 354 F.3d at 287 (interpreting Title VII's terms to mean that
employers will not be liable for the acts of everyone in their employ).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). Congress added the "motivating factor" language in 1991
in response to the Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Hill, 354
F.3d at 284. Prior to the amendment, in Price Waterhouse, the Court held that if an employer
made a decision motivated by forbidden reasons, the employer could escape liability by showing
it would have made the same decision even without a forbidden motive. Id. With the addition of
the "motivating factor" language, employers can no longer automatically escape liability in this
manner. Id. Now, a plaintiff may proceed by demonstrating-by direct or circumstantial
evidence-that an employer used a "forbidden consideration with respect to 'any employment
practice."' Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 97-98 (2003). The implication of the term
"motivating factor" is evidence to some proponents of the doctrine that Congress intended to hold
an employer liable when forbidden classifications are but a factor. Brewer Petition, supra note 8,
at 25. Yet some courts disagree, finding that, because Title VII was designed to avoid
discrimination by providing employers with an incentive to control their employees, forbidden
classifications must be used as more than just a motivating factor. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ.
of Ill.,
479 F.3d 908, 920 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 357 (2007). It would be
contrary to the underlying intent of Title VII if an employer could be liable for employee conduct
that it could not practically prevent, as the employer would have no incentive to create
mechanisms deterring discrimination and harassment in the workplace. Id.; see also Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 764 (discussing the deterrent purpose of Title VII).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). See, e.g., Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 29-30 (discussing the
necessity of establishing causation based on the statutory language of Title VII).
65. See BCI, 450 F.3d at 48-87 (noting how standard tort causation comports with Supreme
Court precedent).
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66
these principles in subordinate bias liability is not clearly defined.
Although courts consistently find that independent investigations break
the chain of causation, 67 proponents of either extreme-the input
standard and the actual decisionmaker standard-vary with respect to
causation's importance. 6 8 In addition, what suffices as a truly
independent investigation is far from clear.6 9

For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, in its brief as amicus
curiae in support of BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company's petition to the

Supreme Court in an employment discrimination case, argued that
causation alone is not enough to hold an employer liable. 70 The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce argued that a plaintiff must prove that the
employer is liable based on agency principles. 7 1 In contrast, on appeal
to the Fifth Circuit in Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, the
plaintiff argued that substantial evidence showing her co-worker's agebased animus "played a role" in the decisionmaker's choice to terminate
her should be adequate to maintain a jury verdict in her favor. 72 Indeed,
some scholars suggest that Congress' use of the phrase "motivating
factor" in Title VII evinces an intent to eliminate "but-for" causation
entirely. 73 They argue that although the statute still requires causation
in some form, the discriminatory conduct need not be the "but-for"
74
factor.
Furthermore, the statutory definition of "employer" includes "any
agent" of an employer. 75 Therefore, according to the U.S. Chamber of
66. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 8-9, BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. EEOC, 127 S.Ct. 852 (2007)
(No. 06-341) [hereinafter Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce]; see also BCI, 450 F.3d at 486-87
(discussing how circuits vary in use of causation and advocating that Title VII requires that a
subordinate play more than a "peripheral role").
67. BCI, 450 F.3d at 488. By ensuring that any tangible employment actions are the result of
an inquiry the causal nexus is broken, and discrimination cannot be the substantial factor for the
action. Id.
68. Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at 9-11.
69. Compare Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007), with Tate v. Executive
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No 105-CV-47-TS, 2007 WL 1650410, at *4 (N.D. Ind. June 4, 2007) (for an
indication of varying standards regarding the impartiality of investigations).
70. Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at 11.
71. ld. at 11-12.
72. Appellant's Brief at 24-25, Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219 (5th Cir.
2000) (No. 99-41390) [hereinafter Russell Brief].
73. White & Krieger, supra note 45, at 505.
74. Id.
75. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). The term "agent" directs courts to look to agency
principles in determining employer liability. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
791-92 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (jointly holding that
an employer will be vicariously liable for "an actionable hostile environment created by a
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Commerce, Congress explicitly directed lower courts to utilize agency
principles in interpreting Title VII. 7 6 Yet Congress did not define
agency in the statute. 77 Thus, the courts must rely on common law
interpretations of agency. 7 8 The resulting problem, as the Restatement

(Third) of Agency (Restatement of Agency) notes, is that in Title VII
cases common law agency principles are often modified depending on
the facts of each case.79 Thus, the circuits still differ with respect to
who should be liable under subordinate bias theory. 80 The Fourth
Circuit declined to hold an employer liable for the acts of a subordinate
with no supervisory or disciplinary authority. 8 1 In contrast, the Tenth
Circuit found such a position to be contrary to the spirit of Title VII,
instead finding that a simple agency relationship is sufficient to impose
liability. 82
In employment litigation, courts often apply the Restatement of
Agency's position that an employer will be liable if his servant was
"aided in accomplishing" his act '"by the existence of the agency
relationship." 83 In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court clarified its standard for
supervisor liability. 84 The Supreme Court stated that it is appropriate to

supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee"). In addition,
the Court fashioned an affirmative defense for employers if they "exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct" employee behavior, and if the plaintiff "unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise." Faragher,524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
76. Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at 11-12; see also Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 754-55 (instructing lower courts to rely "on the general common law of agency" in analyzing
employer liability, as opposed to any state laws) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989)).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
78. Ellerth, 524 F.3d at 755-56.
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, Introduction 8-9 (2006); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 755 (noting that, since its decision in Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986),
courts acknowledge that not all common law principles are applicable to Title VII cases).
80. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir. 2006) (arguing
that the "aided by the agency relation" standard would permit an employer to be vicariously liable
for the bias of a subordinate who caused an adverse employment decision), cert. granted, 127 S.
Ct. 852 (2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007); Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics
Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that an employer should only be liable
for the acts of a subordinate who was essentially the actual decisionmaker in an adverse
employment decision).
81. Hill, 354 F.3d at 291, 297-98.
82. BCI, 450 F.3d at 487-88 (exploring the agency relationship between employer and
employee and when tort liability of the employee applies to the employer).
83. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801-02 (1998) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958)); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758.
84. Faragher,524 U.S. at 807 ("An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized
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hold an employer liable under Title VII for the improper conduct of a
supervisor made possible by virtue of his authority even if that conduct
was outside the scope of his employment. 8 5 Yet, the Court also
emphasized that to avoid overly broad and excessive liability, more than
a mere employment relationship is needed.86 A tangible employment
action 87 is the most obvious trigger, but beyond that the Court declined
to articulate a more definitive guideline for what constitutes an "aided
' 88
by the agency relationship."
Faragher and Burlington are significant cases defining employer
liability under Title VII, yet they deal with acts of supervisors and
implicitly emphasize situations where the discriminatory party has
power to take action. 89 In other words, unlike subordinate bias
liability-the subject of this Comment-Faragherand Burlington speak

to situations in which supervisors do not need a cat to reach into the fire
for them. 90 Nonetheless, the Court's view of agency principles and the
"aided by the agency relationship" standard is instructive about possible
solutions to subordinate bias liability claims. 9 1 Parties advocating a
stricter model of subordinate liability argue that expanding the "aided
by the agency relationship" standard to subordinate bias liability claims
would expose employers to liability for unreasonable acts of
employees. 92 On the other hand, supporters of a less-stringent measure
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over an employee."); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65 (adopting the
holding set forth in Faragherestablishing supervisory liability).
85. Faragher,524 U.S. at 802; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762-63.
86. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. Otherwise, the Court reasoned, "[p]roximity and regular contact
may afford a captive pool of potential victims," and an employer could be liable for all co-worker
harassment. Id.
87. A tangible employment action results in a "significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits." Id. at 761.
88. Id. at 760, 763.
89. See generally Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791-92; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (describing
employer liability for the discriminatory acts of supervisors based on principles of agency law).
90. The Court's discussion throughout both opinions does not address any situations where a
worker with discriminatory animus motivates another to make an employment decision. Instead,
in Ellerth, the Court emphasizes the tangible employment actions at issue: "[O]ne co-worker
cannot dock another's pay, nor can one co-worker demote another. Tangible employment actions
fall within the special province of the supervisor." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. In fact, the Court
cites the Seventh Circuit's decision in Shager in both cases as a valid application of the cat's paw
doctrine but does not reveal an opinion regarding the doctrine. Faragher,524 U.S. at 791;
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
91. Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 26.
92. Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at 13 (interpreting the "aided by the
agency relation" standard literally would "unreasonably impose strict liability on employers for
many a frolic and detour that the employer simply cannot reasonably control or prevent").
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contend that the "aided by the agency relationship" standard balances
Title VIl's objectives by creating an incentive for employers to take
action to ensure their agents conduct themselves in a permissible
for employee acts
manner, while also precluding employer liability
93
obviously outside the scope of their authority.
C. Using the Cat's Paw Doctrine to Bring an Employment
DiscriminationClaim
Although the cat's paw doctrine is relatively new in employment
discrimination law, it operates as part of the traditional framework for
proving discrimination. 9 4 Under this traditional framework, a plaintiff
can bring an employment discrimination claim either indirectly or
directly. 95 Under the indirect method, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 96 This can be done by
proving four elements: 1) membership in a protected class, 2)
qualification for the job, 3) an adverse employment decision, and 4)
circumstances indicating the protected class membership was the reason
for the adverse employment decision. 9 7 Upon proving these elements,
the burden then shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate,
9 8 If
nondiscriminatory rationale for the adverse employment decision.
the employer establishes a nondiscriminatory rationale, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's reason was
pretextual. 99 In contrast, under the conventional direct method, a
evidence to prove that
plaintiff simply presents direct or circumstantial
10 0
animus.
discriminatory
an employer acted with
Under either method, plaintiffs believing a fellow employee induced
an adverse employment action based on prohibited animus may choose
to use the cat's paw doctrine to advance their case. 10 1 Employing the

93. Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 13.
94. Shager v. Upjohn, 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture,
235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000).
95. Russell, 235 F.3d at 222.
96. Id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)).
97. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Dyke v. O'Neal Steel,
Inc., 327 F.3d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 2003). This is known as the "McDonnell-Douglas" burdenshifting framework. For a discussion of McDonnell Douglas, see Christopher R. Hedican et al.,
McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 383, 385 (2004) (summarizing the

history of McDonnell Douglas and its progeny).
98. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
99. Id.

100. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 357 (2007).
101. Circumstances where a biased employee might wield control over employment decisions
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indirect method (McDonnell-Douglas framework), evidence of
subordinate bias may be used either to establish elements of the prima
facie case of discrimination or to prove pretext. 0 2 Alternatively, a
plaintiff could proceed under the direct theory of proof, "presenting a
'convincing mosaic' of direct or circumstantial evidence that could
permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the employer acted with
103
discriminatory intent."

With an understanding of the cat's paw's beginnings, its relationship
to the broader employment discrimination context, and its real-world
application in litigation, this Comment will next discuss representative

cases addressing subordinate bias liability, focusing on how various
circuits apply the cat's paw doctrine to Title VII principles.
III. DISCUSSION

While the circuit courts unanimously agree that a subordinate's bias
can trigger liability, 10 4 they lack a uniform approach as to which
circumstances support a cause of action. 10 5 The standards set forth by
the various circuits "differ as to the degree to which a biased
intermediate supervisor must contribute to an adverse employment
decision before an employer may be held liable."' 1 6 This Part will
explore the three main approaches used by the circuit courts to establish
subordinate bias or cat's paw liability. 10 7 Part III.A addresses the more
lenient "input" standard employed by the First, Third, and Fifth
circuits. 10 8 Part III.B will analyze the middle-ground "causation"
include omitting relevant information, providing "tainted" recommendations, or otherwise
manipulating the manner in which employment decisions are conducted. White & Krieger, supra
note 45, at 513-14 (citing Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.
1997)).
102. Loren Gesinsky & Douglas B. Lipsky, When The Subordinate's Bias Matters, N.Y. LJ.,
May 21, 2007, at 10. A reason is pretextual if it is a "dishonest explanation" or a "deliberate
falsehood." Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 696 (7th Cir. 2006). For example, in
McDonnell Douglas, where the employer fired a black employee for engaging in civil rights
activities, the Court noted that evidence of pretext could be found if the employer did not fire a
white employee for comparably serious acts. 411 U.S. at 805.
103. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Jordan v.
City of Gary, 396 F.3d 825, 832 (7th Cir. 2005)), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 357 (2007).
104. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 20.
105. Brewer Petition, supra note 8, at 16.
106. Id.
107. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 486-88 (10th Cir. 2006)
(detailing the three approaches and ultimately adopting the causation standard), cert. granted, 127
S. Ct. 852 (2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S.Ct. 1931 (2007).
108. See infra Part LII.A (discussing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Russell v. McKinney Hosp.
Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227-28 (5th Cir. 2000), and the more lenient standard for analyzing cat's
paw claims).
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standard originally adopted by the Seventh Circuit and used by the
Tenth Circuit. 10 9
Part ILI.C then discusses the strictest "actualdecisionmaker" standard promulgated by the Fourth Circuit and
10
(arguably) recently adopted by the Seventh Circuit. I
A. The Input Standard
Under the input standard, a more lenient approach to the cat's paw
doctrine, a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment by demonstrating that
a biased supervisor without decisionmaking authority gave information
that might have influenced or affected an adverse employment
decision."' This is the most pro-plaintiff model, subjecting employers
to liability even if the plaintiff cannot prove that another subordinate's
biased views actually motivated or influenced the decision. 112 While
several circuits have utilized this method, including the First and Third
Circuits, 113 this Part will discuss the Fifth Circuit's decision in Russell
1 14
v. McKinney Hospital Venture as a model of the input standard.
Russell involved a claim for violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) based on Sandra Russell's termination as
Director of Clinical Services at Columbia Homecare of McKinney
(McKinney). l l5 A jury found that defendant McKinney violated the
ADEA, but the trial court granted McKinney's motion for judgment as a

109. See infra Part I1.B (discussing the Tenth Circuit's use of the causation standard in BCJ).
110. See infra Part M.C (explaining the Fourth Circuit's use of the actual decisionmaker
standard in Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004), and
arguing that the Seventh Circuit recently aligned itself with this standard through its decision in
Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
357 (2007)).
111. Gesinsky & Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10; Brewer Petition, supra note 8, at 22.
112. See Gesinsky & Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10 (discussing the lenient standard).
113. The First Circuit found the necessary inquiry to be whether "discriminatory comments
were made by the key decisionmaker or those in a position to influence the decisionmaker."
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000) (emphasis
added). Furthermore, the Third Circuit determined that the defendant college could be liable for
religious discrimination even where there was evidence that the decisionmaker had no
discriminatory animus, and the discriminatory conduct of a supervisor influenced the termination.
Abramson v. William Patterson College, 260 F.3d 265, 285 (3d Cir. 2001). The court stated,
"Under our case law, it is sufficient if those exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or
participated in the decision to terminate." Id.
114. See infra notes 115-35 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Russell v.
McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227-28 (5th Cir. 2000)).
115. Russell, 235 F.3d at 221; see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) (it is unlawful "to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age").
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matter of law, and Russell appealed. 116 Russell, age fifty-four, began
work at McKinney the same day as her supervisor, Carol Jacobsen, age
fifty-three.117 Shortly after, twenty-eight-year-old Steve Ciulla began
work as the Director of Operations, a job hierarchically equal to Russell,
in which Ciulla also reported to Jacobsen. 1 18 Importantly, Ciulla's
father was the CEO of McKinney's parent company. 119
To assess whether judgment as a matter of law was appropriate, the
Russell Court utilized the aforementioned McDonnell-Douglas

framework for indirect discrimination. 120

McKinney offered a

legitimate reason for terminating Russell: a need for a new management
style.' 2 1 To prove this was merely pretextual, Russell offered evidence

that Ciulla's age-based animus was the true reason for her firing. 122
Russell submitted that she received favorable evaluations only two

months prior to her termination and received no formal warnings about
any problems with her work. 123 The jury heard evidence that Ciulla

referred to Russell as an "old bitch" 124 so often that Russell needed
earplugs to continue her work. 125 In addition, Jacobsen's administrative
assistant testified that Ciulla gave Jacobsen an ultimatum that he would
126
quit if Russell was not fired.

116. Russell, 235 F.3d at 221.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra note 97 (discussing the McDonnell-Douglas framework). The Court of
Appeals found that Russell undoubtedly established her prima facie case of discrimination.
Russell, 235 F.3d at 224.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. In fact, Russell's evaluations noted her performance to be "exceptional" or
"exceeding expectations" in all categories but one (where she received a "meets standards"
rating). Id. McKinney's employment policies specified that an employee should receive a formal
oral warning or a "corrective action plan" for problems with their work. Id. These facts
supported the court's determination that a reasonable jury could find McKinney's proffered
reasons for Russell's termination to be pretextual. Id.
124. Id. at 226. The court referenced an explanation by Judge Posner differentiating stray
remarks inapplicable to a plaintiff's case and those which are relevant:
It is different when ...it may be possible to infer that the decision makers were
influenced by [the discriminatory] feelings in making their decision .... Emanating

from a source that influenced the personnel action (or nonaction) of which these
plaintiffs complain, the derogatory comments became evidence of discrimination.
Id. at 229 (quoting Hunt v. City of Markham, II1., 219 F.3d 649, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2000)).
125. Russell, 235 F.3d at 226.
126. Id. at 224. Given these unique facts, Russell's case did not necessitate a discussion of
independent investigations.
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The court found that although Ciulla lacked the power to fire Russell,
a jury could reasonably find that he was influential in causing Russell's
termination. 127 Ciulla's apparent role and the underlying facts of the
case led the court to reverse the district court's judgment as a matter of
28
law and reinstate the jury's original verdict in Russell's favor. 1
The court rejected a more rigid formalistic application of employer
liability, reasoning that such a standard would insulate employers from
liability "by ensuring that the one who performed the employment
action was isolated from the employee, thus eviscerating the spirit of the
'actual decisionmaker' guideline."' 129 The necessary inquiry then,
according to the Fifth Circuit, is to examine whether evidence shows an
employee with discriminatory animus "possessed leverage, or exerted
130
influence, over the titular decisionmaker."
B. The CausationStandard
While the input standard simply speaks of influence, the middleground causation approach is rooted in causation principles, requiring
that a subordinate's bias be a "substantial factor" in an adverse

127. Id. at 226. In particular, the court noted that although ordinary employees usually cannot
affect employment decisions, "[i]f the employee can demonstrate that others had influence or
leverage over the official decisionmaker, and thus were not ordinary coworkers, it is proper to
impute their discriminatory attitudes to the formal decisionmaker." Id. (emphasis added). In
support of this view, the court cited the Seventh Circuit's seminal cat's paw case, Shager v.
Upjohn. Id. at 227; Shager v. Upjohn, 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990); see also supra notes 46-49
and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Shager). Ciulla, as the son of the CEO, enjoyed
many perks that other employees did not, and the court found that a reasonable jury could
conclude that he wielded more power than the typical worker. Russell, 235 F.3d at 228. Ciulla's
ultimatum to Jacobsen, combined with the fact that Ciulla's father controlled Jacobsen's budget
and that Jacobsen feared losing her job indicated that while she may have exercised her actual
power to terminate Russell, in truth Ciulla had significant influence. Id.
128. Id. at 230. For a discussion on the admissibility of employee comments under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, see Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of PsychologicalResearch
Related to Unconscious Discriminationand Implicit Bias In Proving Intentional Discrimination,
73 Mo. L. REv. 83, 110-13 (2008) (in proving intentional discrimination, existence of
discriminatory comments makes it more probable that prohibited characteristics were taken into
account in employment decision, yet comments may be excludable based on grounds of unfair
prejudice or hearsay).
129. Russell, 235 F.3d at 227 n.13. The court's use of the term "actual decisionmaker" may
be confusing in this context, as the term generally refers to the stricter interpretation of the cat's
paw doctrine. Brewer Petition, supra note 8, at 22. It can be inferred from the context of the
court's statements that they are opposed to such a strict standard, and adhering to one would fail
to recognize the person who actually made the decision.
130. Russell, 235 F.3d at 227. The First and Third Circuits also echo this approach. See
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000); Abramson v.
William Patterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 285 (3d Cir. 2001).
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employment decision. 13 1 This model finds support from traditional tort
law as well as the statutory language of Title VII. 132 The language of

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 outlaws employment actions made "because of'
certain prohibited classifications or when those classifications were a
"motivating factor" of an employment decision. 133 In essence, a
plaintiff must show that a subordinate's biased action played a

"sufficient role to give rise to an inference of but-for causation, and that
its effect on the decision must be sufficiently substantial to make it
reasonable to regard it as a proximate cause of that decision."' 134 This
Part will discuss the causation model by examining the Tenth Circuit's
35
decision in EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles. 1
In BC!, the Tenth Circuit reviewed a race discrimination claim
stemming from Stephen Peters' termination.1 3 6 Peters, who is black,

worked at BCI's Albuquerque facility as a merchandiser for six years
before being fired in 2001.137 The EEOC filed suit on Peters' behalf on
the theory that, even if the BCI decisionmakers who actually fired
Peters did not harbor any discriminatory animus, the racially motivated
conduct of Peters' supervisor, Cesar Grado, so substantially affected the
1 38
firing process that BCI should be liable.

The Albuquerque branch of BCI employed 200 workers, of which
sixty percent were Hispanic, and two percent were black. 139 Because

Peters was the most senior merchandiser in the district, he had the most
preferable work schedule, including weekends off. 14 0 The management
structure at BCI operated as follows: Peters reported to Grado, a district

sales manager responsible for scheduling and work assignments, but
131. Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 33.
132. Id. at 32; see also supra Part II.B (discussing the relevant portions of Title VII).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000); Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 30.
134. Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 32.
135. See infra Part III.B (addressing the causation model through a discussion of EEOC v.
BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 852 (2007),
cert. dismissed, 127 S.Ct. 1931 (2007)).

136. BCI, 450 F.3d at 478. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BCI,
holding the EEOC established a prima facie case, but BCI effectively conveyed a legitimate
reason for the termination, namely Peters' "insubordinate conduct toward Grado." Id. at 483.
137. Id. at 478. Merchandisers' job responsibilities consisted of putting Coca-Cola's products
in retail facilities and maintaining the product displays. Id. They typically worked five days a
week, but given the nature of Coca-Cola's retail outlets, merchandisers were needed every day of
the week; therefore, employees had "staggered" schedules. Id.
138. Id. at482.
139. Id. at 478.
140. Id. Peters generally had a reputation for doing his job well. Id. In 2001-the same year
Peters was fired-BCI gave him a certificate of appreciation for his five years of service and for
"being a team player." Id.
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lacking firing or disciplinary power; 14 1 an account manager supervised
Peters on a daily basis, but also reported to Grado. 14 2 BCI's human
in Albuquerque and Phoenix made all
resources department 14(HR)
3
decisions.
employment
The events leading to Peters' termination began when Grado found
himself in a scheduling bind one weekend and received word that Peters
would not come in to work. 14 4 Grado contacted the Phoenix HR
14 5
department to ask if he could require Peters to come in on his day off.
HR responded that it was unacceptable for Peters to refuse to work
absent a compelling reason and told Grado to order Peters to work;
failure to do so would amount to insubordination and be grounds for
termination. 146 When Grado called Peters, Peters replied that he had
plans and could not work. 14 7 Grado told Peters that failure to report
would amount to insubordination. 148 Grado immediately called HR and
told them of his conversation with Peters and of Peters' comment that
his plans were "none of [Grado's] business."' 149 HR determined that
Peters' conduct was tantamount to insubordination and warranted
termination, although it did not make a formal firing decision because it

141. Id. Although Grado, who is Hispanic, lacked actual authority to discipline employees, he
evaluated and monitored employees working under him and had great discretion in reporting
events to BCI's HR department. Id.
142. Id. Although the Account Manager also worked under Grado, it was common practice
for merchandisers like Peters to contact their account managers, rather than the District Manager,
when calling in sick. Id.
143. Id. at 478-79. The management structure of BCI was such that the highest-ranking
human resource officials in both the Albuquerque and Phoenix offices were unaware of Peters
prior to the events that gave rise to this case. Id. at 479.
144. Id. The parties dispute what was actually said between Peters, his account manager and
Grado. Id. Grado contends that the manager told him Peters "might call in sick," which the
manager denied. Id. The semantics do not have a significant bearing on the outcome of the case,
and, as the court reviewed a grant of summary judgment, they were bound to take the facts in the
light most favorable to Peters and the EEOC. Id. at 483.
145. Id. at 479.
146. Id. Grado told HR that Peters planned to call in sick that Sunday (though it is disputed
whether Grado actually knew this to be true). Id. BCI had a policy against calling in sick two
days in advance, which prompted HR to call such a suggestion "unacceptable." Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Peters replied, "Do what you got to do and I'll do what I got to do," which Grado
believed to mean that Peters did not intend to not work that Sunday. Id. Again, the parties
dispute the exact content of the exchange. Grado alleges that he asked Peters what his plans
were, and Peters responded, "none of [Grado's] business," and then began yelling. Id. Peters
however, said that Grado never asked him about his plans. Id.
149. Id. at 480.
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Peters never reported to work that

On Monday, HR officials in the Albuquerque and Phoenix offices
discussed Peters' failure to attend work. 152 They found a disciplinary
status notice from 1999 in his personnel file giving him a suspension
and final warning for a separate incident in which Peters refused to
work. 153 HR officially decided to fire Peters Monday evening and
informed him the next morning. 154 The termination papers stated that
BCI chose to fire Peters for insubordination resulting from his "failure
to comply with the directive [to work on Sunday]."' 5 5
In order to understand how the EEOC proceeded under a theory of
cat's paw liability, it is instructive to explore the nature and extent of
Grado's discriminatory conduct toward Peters. 15 6 Several BCI workers
submitted affidavits regarding Grado's discriminatory behavior toward
black employees, describing incidents where Grado treated black

employees more harshly than Hispanic employees. 157 For example, one
weekend when Grado did not have enough merchandisers to work, he
instructed a Hispanic merchandiser to work on her day off. 158 She told

150. Id.
151. Id. Peters actually became ill that weekend and visited an urgent care clinic, where the
doctor diagnosed him with a sinus infection and ordered him not to work until Monday. Id.
Peters called his Account Manager to tell him he was sick, and the manager excused him from
work. Id. The manager tried repeatedly to contact Grado with this information, but Grado never
returned the communication. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. This disciplinary incident, though not detailed in the personnel file, stemmed from
Peters' refusal to work on his day off when he was acting as a pallbearer at his fiancd's son's
funeral. Id. His supervisor at the time refused to allow this as an excuse because the boy was not
Peters' biological son, even though Peters had raised the boy for years. Id. As a result, Peters'
personnel file stated that he was "rude and unprofessional," and he received a final warning for
insubordination. Id.
154. Id. at480-81.
155. Id. at 481. Yet, in a statement prepared for litigation, HR stated that the termination was
based on Peters' encounter with Grado the previous Friday, bolstered by the 1999 incident in the
personnel file. Id. at 480-81. HR said that Peters was not fired for failure to appear at work that
Sunday, but that his exchange with Grado exemplified a general intent to defy a direct order. Id.
at 481. In addition, HR said that, although they knew Peters was actually sick, it did not change
their decision, because they believed it to be "highly suspect." Id. This is also in dispute, as
Peters' Account Manager alleged that he did not even tell Grado that Peters called in sick until
after Edgar made the termination decision. Id.
156. Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 35-36.
157. BCI, 450 F.3d at 482. The EEOC collected affidavits from two black employees and one
Hispanic employee. Id. One affidavit said, "If Grado did not like you, he treated you badly; but
African American employees were treated even worse."
Id. Others described Grado's
demeaning jokes and comments about black men dating white women. Id.
158. Id.
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him that she intended to celebrate her birthday that weekend and could
not work. 159 She did not show up to work that weekend despite being
directed to do so.16 0 When Grado learned that she did not follow the

order to work, he replied, "[y]ou can't make somebody work on one of
their days off," and never disciplined her. 16 1 The court found that

Grado's behavior toward this Hispanic employee was "dramatic [ally]
differen[t]" compared with his treatment of Peters. 16 2 Combined with
other evidence of racial remarks, this provided sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to "infer that racial animus played a role in Mr. Peters'
163
treatment."
After finding that BCI put forth a nondiscriminatory reason for firing
Peters, the court turned to the issue of subordinate bias liability to
determine whether the EEOC adequately proved that BCI's
nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. 16 4 In reversing the district
court's grant of summary judgment and remanding the case for further
determination regarding pretext, the court discussed its sister circuits'
varying approaches to liability under these circumstances. 165 The Tenth
Circuit had never found for a plaintiff on subordinate liability prior to

BCI, yet in this instance the court determined that the causation
approach best addressed the needs of employers and plaintiffs based on
its agreement with general agency principles and the purposes of Title
VII. 166 The true issue then, according to the Tenth Circuit, was
"whether
the
biased
subordinate's
discriminatory
reports,
recommendation, or other actions caused the adverse employment

action." 167

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 482-83.
162. Id. at 490.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 484. The court stated that because Edgar had no idea Peters was black she could
not possibly have fired him based on discriminatory motivations. Id. Therefore, the EEOC
needed to demonstrate that "Grado harbored a racial animus toward black employees," and that
such animus should be grafted onto BCI even though Grado did not actually fire Peters. Id.
165. Id. at 486-87 (citing Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir.
2000)); see also Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291, 289, 290 (4th
Cir. 2004); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994).
166. BCI, 450 F.3d at 487-88.
167. Id. at 487 (emphasis added) (quoting Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir.
2004)). The court explicitly stated, "[w]e find ourselves in agreement with the Seventh Circuit,"
citing Lust as a model. Id. In fact, the middle-ground standard in Lust has been referred to as
"the most cogently articulated position in the middle of the subordinate bias spectrum." Gesinsky
& Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10. Lust involved a sex discrimination case by a female mattress
sales representative who was passed over for a promotion in favor of a male representative. Lust,
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The court expressed support for subordinate bias liability in general
168

based on the theory's agreement with standard agency principles.
While the Supreme Court's rulings on vicarious liability for employers
did not examine liability for the actions of subordinates, the BCI court
reasoned that the "aided by the agency relationship" standard articulated
by the Supreme Court in Ellerth and Faragher "applies even more
clearly to subordinate bias claims . . . because the allegedly biased
subordinate accomplishes his discriminatory goals by misusing the
authority granted to him by the employer."' 169 In contrast, the Court in
Ellerth contemplated employer liability for acts that did not result in
tangible employment actions. 170 In addition, the BCI court further
reasoned that holding employers liable for the discriminatory acts of
their subordinates advances the underlying purposes of Title VII by

providing employers with incentives
to verify information before
1 71

making employment decisions.
As to their adoption of a causation-based approach to cat's paw
liability, the court reasoned that requiring proof of causation simply
makes sense in light of previous Supreme Court cases affirming the
requirement of a causal connection in Title VII cases. 17 2 Because Title
VII's definition of "employer" utilizes agency and tort concepts, the
Tenth Circuit reasoned that the causation aspects of tort law should also
383 F.3d at 583. Lust's supervisor made sexist comments to her and thought that, as a mother,
she would not be interested in relocating from Wisconsin to Chicago, even though he never asked

if this was true. Id. Even though Lust's supervisor did not make promotion decisions, he had the
power to recommend candidates for promotions. Id. at 584. In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit

clearly stated that it did not follow the strict approach set forth by the Fourth Circuit in Hill v.
Lockheed Martin, as such a view is "inconsistent with the normal analysis of causal issues in tort
litigation." Id. Rather, "the prejudices of an employee.

.

are imputed to the employee who has

formal authority over the plaintiff's job . ..where the subordinate, by concealing relevant
information from the decisionmaking employee or feeding false information to him, is able to
influence the decision." Id. at 585 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
168. BCI, 450 F.3d at 485 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758). The
court engaged in a brief discussion of agency principles embodied in Title VII (how an employer
covers "any agent" of the employer as well), and the "aided by the agency relation" standard
articulated in Ellerth. Id.; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 763 (1998).
169. BC!, 450 F.3d at 485 (emphasis added).
170. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (noting the difficulty when a tangible employment action is not
taken, and holding that where such action is taken, certain affirmative defenses apply to
employers, such as taking preventative measures).
171. BC!, 450 F.3d at 486. This incentive exists because employers may avoid liability if they
perform an independent investigation. Id. In addition, "[r]ecognition of subordinate bias claims
forecloses a strategic option for employers who might seek to evade liability, even in the face of
rampant race discrimination among subordinates, through willful blindness as the source of
reports and recommendations." Id.
172. Id. at 487-88 ("Both the Supreme Court and this Court require a comparable causal
connection as part of analogous workplace discrimination claims.").
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apply in this context. 173 This approach provides an avenue for
employers to avoid liability by requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that
the biased subordinate's actions caused the adverse employment
action. 17 4 Thus, for employers who "[do not] rely exclusively on the
say-so of the biased subordinate ... the causal link is defeated." 175 In
contrast, the court refuted the input and actual decisionmaker standards
as too extreme on either side of the spectrum and devoid of a
76
relationship with Title VII principles. 1
Applying its newly articulated standard to the facts of Peters' case,
the court found that although the HR manager actually fired Peters, she
did so based solely on Grado's description of Peters. 177 Moreover, HR
did not conduct any independent investigation or any separate inquiry
into the facts of the case. 178 As Grado's story caused Peters'
termination, 179 the court reasoned that if a jury found Grado's report to
be tainted with a racial animus, "it could also find that the proffered

reason for firing Mr. Peters, which rests entirely on that report, is
pretextual."' 180 Given the many facts in dispute and accepting the
the court
possibility of subordinate bias as a basis for 18liability,
1
remanded the case for further factual determination.

173. Id.
174. Id. at 486.
175. Id. at 488. However, the court suggested that an employer may be able to avoid liability
by merely asking an employee for his version of events. Id. While in more minor situations this
may be sufficient and certainly the level of investigation necessary will vary depending on the
circumstances, however, simply asking an employee his side of the story may set the bar too low
for a respectable standard. See, e.g., Recent Cases, supra note 5, at 1703 (discussing expectancy
confirmation bias). For a further discussion on independent investigations under the causation
standard, see infra Part V.B (advocating a more discerning approach with respect to
investigations to break the chain of causation).
176. The court found the Fifth Circuit's "influence" standard to be weak, erroneously
removing causation from the inquiry and potentially exposing even diligent employers to liability.
BCI, 450 F.3d at 486-87. In contrast, the court stated that the Fourth Circuit's "actual
decisionmaker" standard took the concept of a cat's paw "too literally," and failed to take into
consideration the "aided by the agency relation" principle of Title VII. Id. at 488.
177. Id. at 491.
178. Id.
179. The court noted that BCI put forth two explanations for why it fired Peters, both of which
could be found pretextual by a reasonable jury. Id. at 490-91. If, as stated on the termination
papers, BCI fired Peters for not showing up to work, a jury could find pretext because Katt
excused Peters from work. Id. BCI changed its position later to state that Peters' insubordination
caused his termination, in which case the racial discrimination of Grado would come into play.
Id.
180. Id. at491-92.
181. Id. at 492-93.
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Following the Tenth Circuit's decision, BCI applied for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari on
January 5, 2007.182 Days before oral arguments were scheduled,
however, BCI dismissed the case. 183 The need for the Supreme Court
1 84
to hear a cat's paw case will be discussed in Part V.
C. The "Actual Decisionmaker" Standard
Compared with the input and causation standards, the "actual
decisionmaker" model is the most demanding, virtually requiring that
the employer with decisionmaking power act merely as a marionette of
its biased subordinate.185 For courts following by this standard, the
relevant inquiry is "[whether] the decisionmaker [is] completely
182. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007). A variety of organizations
filed amicus briefs on behalf of both parties, including: [For Petitioners] The Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, 2007 WL 527497 (Feb. 20, 2007); National School Boards
Association, 2007 WL 542424 (Feb. 20, 2007); Equal Employment Advisory Council, 2007 WL
549101 (Feb. 20, 2007); Food Marketing Institute, 2007 WL 549102 (Feb. 20, 2007); Society for
Human Resource Management, 2007 WL 647974 (Feb. 20, 2007); [For Respondents] National
Employment Lawyers Association and NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 2007 WL
966520 (Mar. 27, 2007); American Association for Justice, 2007 WL 951132 (Mar. 27, 2007);
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, AARP, American Association of People with
Disabilities, Asian American Justice Center, National Partnership for Women & Families,
National Women's Law Center, Pick Up The Pace, and Public Justice Center, 2007 WL 951130
(Mar. 27, 2007).
183. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007); Marilyn Geewax, CCE
Unit Tells Court to Let Bias Case Proceed, ATLANTA J. & CONSTIT., Apr. 13, 2007, at GI. A
statement from the EEOC's general counsel stated that the dismissal was a unilateral decision on
the part of BCI, "and does not involve any settlement or any agreement between the parties. We
expect that the case will be remanded to the district court in New Mexico for further proceedings,
consistent with the Tenth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals' decision." Mark A. Hofmann,
Subordinate Bias Case Pulled from High Court, BUS. INS., Apr. 16, 2007, at 3. Ultimately, BCI
settled with the EEOC for $250,000 in addition to several injunctive measures. News Release,
EEOC, BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. to Pay $250,000 to Black Worker for Race Discrimination
(Apr. 15, 2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-15-08.html.
The injunctive relief
includes: carrying out policies that promote a discrimination-free work environment; distributing
those policies to current and new employees, including written statements about reporting bias in
the workplace; and providing training sessions to all management and supervisory employees. Id.
Finally, the settlement prohibits BCI from retaliating against Peters or any employee who acted as
a witness in the case, and Peters' firing was turned into a voluntary resignation. Id.
184. See infra Part V.A (discussing the importance of the Supreme Court ruling on a cat's paw
case in the near future).
185. The standard is recognized as the most employer-friendly standard. Jeffrey L. Needle,
Defeat the 'Cat's Paw' Defense to Vicarious Liability, TRIAL, Jun. 2008, at 52, 54. By requiring
that the subordinate be the "actual decisionmaker" or one "principally responsible" for an
employment decision, adherents to this standard come very close to a literal interpretation of the
cat's paw doctrine, essentially mandating that a subordinate control the decisionmaker
completely. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th Cir.
2004) (holding that an employer will only be liable for the acts of the person who in reality makes
the decision).
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beholden to the subordinate such that the subordinate is the actual
decisionmaker." 186 Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management,187
decided by the Fourth Circuit, is often cited as the model for this
standard. 18 8 In addition, the Seventh Circuit recently clarified its
position regarding the cat's paw doctrine in Brewer v. Board of Trustees
of University of Illinois,1 89 arguably adopting the actual decisionmaker
standard. 190
This section will discuss the details of each case
separately.
1. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management
Hill involved a claim for wrongfuil termination based on sex and age
under Title VII and the ADEA.' 9' Ethel Hill, the plaintiff, worked for
Lockheed Martin Logistics Management (Lockheed), the defendant, as
a sheet metal mechanic fixing military aircraft from 1987 until her
termination in 1998.192
Lockheed organized its management as
follows: Hill reported to a "lead person," who in turn reported to a
senior site supervisor and program manager. 193 Lockheed also assigned
a safety inspector to each site. 194 The safety inspectors had no
supervisory or disciplinary authority; they too worked under the lead

186. Gesinsky & Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10.
187. See infra Part II.C.I (discussing the details of the Hill case and Fourth Circuit's
decision).
188. See, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir. 2006),
cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007); Gesinsky & Lipsky,
supra note 102, at 10; Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 20-21 (all citing Hill). Additionally,
the Eleventh Circuit generally follows this model. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13-14,
Sawicki v. Morgan State Univ., 127 S. Ct. 2095 (No. 06-306) (2007).
189. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the details of the Brewer case and the Seventh Circuit's
decision).
190. See Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that
"the employee must possess so much influence as to basically be herself the true 'functional
decision-maker"'), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 357 (2007). See also Brewer Petition, supra note 8, at
13, 17 (arguing that the Seventh Circuit rejected precedent by adopting the actual decisionmaker
standard similar to the Fourth Circuit).
191. Hill, 354 F.3d at 281. The district court granted Lockheed's motion for summary
judgment, and a divided Fourth Circuit panel reversed. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt.,
Inc., 314 F.3d 657 (4th Cir. 2003). The Fourth Circuit reheard the case en banc, ultimately ruling
7-4 to reinstate summary judgment. Hill, 354 F.3d at 281.
192. Hill, 354 F.3d at 282. At the time of termination, Hill was fifty-seven years old. Id. She
worked at Lockheed for eleven years, but was employed in the aircraft industry for twenty-five
years. Id. at 300 (Michael, J., dissenting). Hill was the only woman on her eight-member crew at
Fort Drum. Id.
193. Id. at 282 (majority opinion). The senior site supervisor did not work at the mechanic's
field site. Id.
194. Id.
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sure that certain
person but were additionally responsible for making
19 5
out.
carried
properly
were
modifications
aircraft
Hill received three written reprimands in the last eight months of her
196
employment at Lockheed from two different lead persons.

According to Lockheed's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), if an
employee received two written reprimands with no suspension and one
197
with a suspension, that employee would be subject to termination.
After Hill's third reprimand, her lead person sent her paperwork to the

program manager decided to
senior supervisor, whereupon he and 9the
8

fire Hill pursuant to Lockheed's SOP.1
Hill subsequently filed discrimination and retaliation charges with the
EEOC and brought suit against Lockheed on the theory that her safety
inspector, Ed Fultz, discriminated against her based on her age and sex,
19 9
which led to the reprimands that instigated her termination.
According to Hill, Fultz called her a "'useless old lady' who needed to

be retired, a 'troubled old lady,' and a 'damn woman,' on several
Hill believed that because she reported Fultz's
occasions." 20 0
comments to her lead 1person, Fultz retaliated against her by reporting
20
the safety violations.

The court began its analysis by considering which employees can be
decisionmakers under the terms of Title VII. It reasoned that, although
"employer" includes an agent of the employer, employers are not
vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of everyone they

195. Id.
196. Id. at 281. Hill's reprimands included 1) a violation for "unsatisfactory quality or
quantity of work" at Fort Bragg for installing rivets that were too small; 2) a reprimand with a
suspension for failing to report a missing tool; and 3) another unsatisfactory quality violation for
Fort Drum. Id. at 282, 292, 295.
197. Id. at 282.
198. Id. Lockheed filled her position with a forty-seven-year-old male. Id.
199. Id. at 282, 283. Hill conceded that neither lead person discriminated against her in
issuing the reprimands and that senior management did not act out of biased motivations either.
Id. at 283. She pursued her case under two frameworks: mixed-motive and pretext. Id. at 285.
For mixed-motive, she asserted that, although her reprimands may have been a factor in
Lockheed's termination decision, the discrimination by Fultz made the decision one of mixedmotivation. Id. at 286. For pretext, she argued that Fultz's involvement in her firing could
provide evidence of discrimination, and that Lockheed's proffered reasons were pretextual. Id. at
286.
200. Id. at 283. The dissenting opinion notes that "Fultz targeted Hill immediately" and that
Fultz did not like having women working beneath him. Id. at 300 (Michael, J., dissenting).
Although Hill complained to Dixon, he took no action against Fultz. Id.
201. Id. at 283 (majority opinion). The court also noted that Fultz reported "admittedly valid
infractions." Id.
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employ. 20 2 After discussing the Supreme Court's views of vicarious
liability and the origins of the cat's paw doctrine, the court concluded
that statutory construction and precedent did not support an expansive
view of cat's paw liability (such as "substantial influence"), as Hill
argued.2 03
Previous Supreme Court cases emphasizing responsibility for those
who actually made tangible employment decisions led the court to
decide that the motivations of such decisionmakers should determine
responsibility. 20 4 The court reasoned that such a philosophy would be
consistent with the cat's paw doctrine because if a subordinate induces a
decisionmaker to take an action-like the monkey inducing the cat to
stick its paw into the flames-it is consistent to call that subordinate the
actual decisionmaker. 20 5 This limited application of subordinate bias
liability was sensible to the court in that it would not permit a biased
subordinate without any decisionmaking authority to cause an employer
to be liable merely because the subordinate may have influenced a
decision. 20 6 To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would graft liability
onto an employer for acts of employees who were not actually agents
20 7
simply based on influence.
Applying these principles to the facts of Hill's case, Lockheed could
only be found liable if Fultz acted as a functional decisionmaker in

202. Id. In fact, the court reasoned that by virtue of incorporating agents into the definition of
employer, Congress "evinced an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which
employers are to be held responsible." Id. (quoting Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 F.3d
277, 287 (4th Cir. 2004)).
203. Hill, 354 F.3d at 287-89. The court discussed Ellerth's emphasis that tangible
employment actions are generally the province of supervisors and official company acts, and
Shager v. Upjohn, and Reeves v. Sanderson'sfinding that summary judgment is inappropriate in
light of evidence that a subordinate was the actual decisionmaker in a termination proceeding. Id.
at 287-88; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000); Shager v. Upjohn,
913 F.2d 398,405 (7th Cir. 1990); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 763, 765 (1998).
204. Hill, 354 F.3d at 287-89 ("[T]he Court's clear emphasis upon who holds 'actual
decisionmaking' power and authority or who has 'principal responsibility' for an employment
decision is consistent with the limitations set forth in Ellerth.").
205. Id. at 290. The court also declined to "further parse" applications of the cat's paw
doctrine, like other circuits. Id.
206. The court stated:
[W]e decline to endorse a construction of the discrimination statutes that would allow a
biased subordinate who has no supervisory or disciplinary authority and who does not
make the final or formal employment decision to become a decisionmaker simply
because he had a substantial influence on the ultimate decision or because he has
played a role, even a significant one, in the adverse employment decision.
Id. at 291.
207. Id.
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Hill's termination. 20 8 The circumstances of Hill's second reprimand
involved a missing tool, which Fultz reported to the lead person. 20 9 The
court heard evidence that Hill lied about not having the tool in a
conversation with the lead person and determined that because the lead
person investigated the matter personally, Fultz was not principally
responsible for the second reprimand. 2 10 The events leading to Hill's
third reprimand occurred several days after her return from suspension
and involved discrepancies in the requirements of modification work
orders on which Hill signed off.2 1 1 Fultz wrote six discrepancy reports
based on Hill's work, which she asserted were "nitpicky and trivial,"
2 12
and issued in the context of his discriminatory comments toward her.
Nevertheless, because the lead person conducted an independent
investigation, individually investigated each discrepancy report, and
found all but one to be accurate, Fultz could not be the actual
decisionmaker in Hill's third reprimand either. 2 13 With respect to her
overall termination, the court ruled that although Fultz brought issues of
Hill's performance to his superior's attention, thus initiating the
disciplinary and termination processes, Fultz could in no way be
214
deemed "principally responsible" for her firing.

208. Id. at 294.
209. Id. at 292. Lockheed had a tool control policy that required mechanics to report lost
tools; each mechanic had tools with their identification number printed on them. Id. Military
employees at Fort Drum found cutters with Hill's identification on them and delivered them to
Fultz, who reported and delivered the missing cutters to the lead person. Id. Although the
evidence is disputed, the court found that when the lead person asked Hill about the missing
cutters, she denied losing any tools. Id. at 292-93. The lead testified that had Hill admitted to
losing the tool, she would not have been reprimanded. Id. at 295. Judge Michael's dissent
however, gives a very different view of the circumstances leading to Hill's reprimands and
termination. Id. at 300-01 (Michael, J., dissenting). His opinion states that Hill, owning three
identical pairs of cutters, had no idea a pair was missing; in addition, Hill contended that Fultz
lied to the lead person about her knowledge of the cutters, and his report caused the lead to
believe Hill lied, which was the reason for her reprimand. Id.
210. Id. at 295 (majority opinion).
211. Id. Judge Michael's dissent also adds more context in a light favorable to Hill regarding
the third reprimand. Id. at 300 (Michael, J., dissenting). Apparently, upon returning from
suspension, Hill again complained to her lead person about Fultz's discriminatory conduct and
the lead told Fultz that Hill initiated a complaint against him. Id. This caused Fultz to "react[]
with noticeable anger towards Hill." Id.
212. Id. at 295-96 (majority opinion). In fact, Fultz wrote that each error was "minor," and
had discretionary power to determine whether or not to write up small errors. Id. at 300 (Michael,
J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 295-96 (majority opinion).
214. Id. at 297. Moreover, the court emphasized that the lead person made "independent, nonbiased determinations" after each infraction reported by Fultz, and therefore, summary judgment
in favor of Lockheed was appropriate. Id. Judge Michael's dissent discusses how management
actually spoke with Fultz in great detail before making the ultimate determination to fire Hill. Id.
at 301 (Michael, J., dissenting). Neither manager ever contacted Hill during their deliberations,
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In a dissenting opinion, 2 15 Judge Michael expressed dissatisfaction
with the court's adoption of the actual decisionmaker standard,
describing the position as "at odds with virtually every other circuit"
and the statutory language. 2 16 Judge Michael stated the standard
rendered Title VII and the ADA "essentially toothless when it comes to
protecting employees." 2 17 In addition, Judge Michael chided the court

for failing to draw inferences in Hill's favor. 2 18

By overlooking

causation, he argued that the majority opinion created a narrow standard
that authorizes discriminatory employment actions simply because
subordinates do not have managerial or supervisory power. 2 19 In Judge
Michael's view, if a biased subordinate "substantially influences" an
employment decision, regardless of whether he has supervisory
220
responsibility, his bias should be imputed to the employer.
2. Brewer v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois
Although some scholarship following the decision in Brewer v.
Board of Trustees of University of Illinois maintains that the Seventh
Circuit follows the causation-based approach, 2 2' the opinion arguably
aligns the Seventh Circuit with the Fourth Circuit in adhering to the
actual decisionmaker standard.2 22
Lonnell Brewer, the plaintiff,

which was a violation of Lockheed's policy. Id. Most interesting however, is that the managers
"relied on Fultz to write and sign Hill's termination statement, a document explaining that Hill
was fired because Fultz found her work to be unsatisfactory." Id.
215. Dissenting opinions were not published for any of the other cases discussed in this Part.
216. Hill, 354 F.3d at 299 (Michael, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 299, 301. Three other circuit judges joined Judge Michael. Id. at 305.
218. Id. at 299. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Hill, Judge Michael concluded
that Fultz used his discretion in issuing safety violations to Hill and manipulated the lead person
into issuing reprimands. Id. at 304-05. Fultz portrayed Hill "in the worst possible light" to her
supervisors and managers, which, taken with the aforementioned, supported an inference that he
"orchestrated those reprimands because of an animus toward Hill." Id. at 305. Finally, the
dissent noted that the senior managers, those with the actual power to terminate Hill, did not
exercise independent judgment in making their decision. Id. A significant lesson from the
dissent's opinion is the importance of the appellate standard of review, because a comparison of
the majority and dissent's description of the facts indicates that perhaps the majority did not take
all reasonable inferences in Hill's favor. Id. at 282-83, 299, 300. Under the dissent's
interpretation of the circumstances, "[t]he record also provides ample grounds for labeling Fultz
as an actual decisionmaker," yet Judge Michael declined to delve into that issue in his opinion.
Id. at 305.
219. Id. at 301.
220. Id. at 302.
221. See Brief of EEOC, supra note 29 (discussing Lust v. Sealy, 383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir.
2004), cited as the Seventh Circuit's approach using the causation standard).
222. For example, while Brewer was decided in March 2007, in June 2007, Angelo J. Genova
and Francis J. Vernoia wrote an article stating that "[tihe Seventh Circuit has established a low
threshold," and the article cited Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir.
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brought this case against the University of Illinois alleging that it
violated Titles VI and VII when it fired him based on his race and
removed him from his graduate studies program. 223 Brewer argued that

the racial bias of his supervisor, Kerrin Thompson, should have been
imputed to the University, as she caused his termination. 224 The district
court granted the University's motion for summary judgment, and the
225
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Brewer, who is black, was a student in the University's Institute of
Labor and Industrial Relations master's program and, as part of the
program, worked as a research assistant at the University's Personnel
Services Office (PSO). 2 26 Thompson, his supervisor, worked as
assistant to the PSO Director, Denise Hendricks. 227 When Brewer
began his employment, Thompson explained the details of the jobspecifically, where he could park while working at the PSO. 22 8 Shortly
thereafter, Brewer began to experience difficulty at the PSO, which he
attributed to Thompson learning that his fianc6e was white. 2 29 Brewer

2004) for support. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 20. In May 2007, Loren Gesinky and
Douglas B. Lipsky put the Seventh Circuit in the middle of the spectrum, citing its decision in
Lust. Gesinsky & Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10. While the court did not explicitly adopt the
Fourth Circuit's standard in Brewer, it recognized that its precedent on the cat's paw had not
always been clear and stated that "the employee must possess so much influence as to basically
be herself the true functional decisionmaker." Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F,3d
908, 917, 919 (7th Cir. 2007), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 357 (2007). In contrast, only three years
prior, the Seventh Circuit stated in Lust that the Hill standard "is not the view of this court," and
cited cases holding that subordinates may cause an employer to be liable where they are "able to
influence the decision." Lust, 383 F.3d at 584-85 (quoting Maarouf v. Walker Mfg. Co., 210
F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2000)). See also Davis, supra note 59, at 258 (analyzing the Seventh
Circuit model as enunciated by Shager). Within the Seventh Circuit, uncertainty exists as to how
significant of a departure Brewer may have been. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 2007 WL 2566259,
at *2 (C.D. I11.Aug. 16, 2007) (noting that the parties disagreed as to whether Brewer changed
subordinate bias law or simply clarified it). As a further example of how muddled the
characterizations of cat's paw cases can be in general, see Fowler, supra note 9, at 45, which calls
the Fifth Circuit's approach in Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir.
2000), a "middle of the road approach."
223. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 914. This discussion will primarily address Brewer's Title VII claim
for his job termination. While his subsequent removal from his graduate studies program is
related to the circumstances of his job, it is not as pertinent to this article's discussion.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 909.
226. Id. at 909-10.
227. Id. at 910, 917. Both Thompson and Hendricks were white. Id.
228. Id. at 910. The facts were taken in a light most favorable to Brewer and were significant
to the events that followed. See infra note 249 (discussing how the court construed facts in favor
of the University). According to Brewer, Thompson provided him with a temporary parking
sticker that day and gestured to general areas where he could park. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 910.
Brewer determined from her gesturing that he could park anywhere around the PSO vicinity. Id.
229. Id.
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believed that Thompson became hostile toward him and attempted to
embarrass him. 2 30 Another black employee at the PSO warned him that
Thompson was a racist and that Thompson had been overheard
reproaching Brewer behind his back.2 3 1
The event leading to Brewer's termination came during the spring
semester and involved a problem with his parking pass. 2 32 Brewer
received a parking ticket because his temporary pass broke off his
rearview mirror. 2 33 When he took the pass to the university's parking
services to be replaced, parking services discovered that the PSO's
2 34
parking application for Brewer contained inaccurate information.
When Brewer went to speak with Thompson about the situation,
Thompson became "irate," and told Brewer that he was not supposed to
2 35
have a parking tag and should not have gone to parking services.
Thompson explained that she had lied in filling out the parking
application so Brewer could get a tag. 23 6 Thompson rebuffed Brewer's
claim that she had given him permission to park anywhere, stating she
237
was "'through with you people' and that Brewer was 'a smart one."'
Brewer told Hendricks, Thompson's supervisor, that he had
permission to park in the lot from Thompson and that Thompson had
behaved in a racist manner toward him. 2 38 Hendricks responded that
those were issues between Thompson and Brewer. 2 39 After examining
the parking pass, Hendricks fired Brewer. 2 40 At her deposition,
230. Id. For example, at his deposition, Brewer said that Thompson would ask people in the
office where he was on days he was not supposed to work and did not allow him to work off-site
at the University's facility for people with dyslexia. Id.
231. Id. at 911. This employee also warned Brewer that Thompson could influence Hendricks
and advised him to keep his own record of the time spent on his work; thereafter, Brewer had the
PSO secretary verify his time in the office. Id.
232. Id. at913.
233. Id.
234. Id. Brewer wrote on the pass to say that he was authorized to park in the lot and Brewer
admitted to adding the ILIR lot on without exact permission. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 913,917.
237. Id. at 913. In his deposition testimony, Brewer also stated that, as he left Thompson's
office, she yelled, "I have had it with you nigger, get my tag!" Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. Again, these were the facts taken in a light most favorable to Brewer. It is disputed
what exact conversations occurred between him and Hendricks.
240. Id. Hendricks knew that in general, a parking mishap did not warrant termination, but
given PSO's "special relationship" with the parking authority, and the prospect of losing "parking
flexibility" and paying an additional $1,000 each year, Hendricks felt she needed to fire someone
to please parking services. Id. While this will not address Brewer's removal from the ILIR
graduate program, it is worth noting at this juncture that Brewer's termination from the PSO also
affected the program's decision. Id. at 914.
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Hendricks stated that she never spoke with Brewer about the parking
situation but had she known that Thompson gave Brewer permission to
write on the pass or that Thompson had acted with discriminatory
animus, there would have been further conversation. 241
In analyzing Brewer's cat's paw claim that Thompson was

responsible for his firing, the court recognized that in some situations,

"what one employee says or doesn't say about another will control...
or may even get an employee fired."' 24 2 Indeed, the court noted that in
this situation a reasonable jury could find that Thompson withheld
relevant information from Hendricks, thereby exercising influence over

the decision to fire Brewer, but only if a jury believed Hendricks' view
of the facts. 24 3 Even so, the court found that a minimal amount of
influence was insufficient to hold an employer liable; the subordinate in
question needed to exercise "singular influence." 244 In this sense, the
decisionmaker must be "totally dependent on another employee to
supply the information on which to base that decision. . . . [T]he
employee that selects, colors and supplies the information [must have]
such power over the nominal decision maker that she is in fact the true,
24 5
functional decisionmaker."
Yet even in situations where a subordinate exercises such substantial
control, the court emphasized that if a decisionmaker independently
investigates facts, he is no longer beholden to the opinion of a biased
employee and will no longer be liable. 24 6 Thus, the employer will not

be liable for such bias so long as the decisionmaker "independently

241. Id. at 913-14; see also Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment at Additional Material Facts, 41, Brewer v. Bd. of Trus. Of Univ. of Ill.,
407 F. Supp. 2d 946 (C.D. I11.Dec. 22, 2005) (citing Hendricks' deposition testimony that she did
not seek Brewer's version of the story before taking action).
242. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 917. The court noted that this influence might be present in the
context of performance reviews, supplying misinformation or failing to provide relevant
information. Id.
243. Id. at 917. Under Brewer's view of the facts, the court found that Hendricks simply
acted in a "cynical but non-racial" way, firing Brewer to curry favor with parking services. Id.
Yet, the court stated that, ironically, Hendricks' spin on the events suggested that she fired
Brewer for "dishonestly altering his parking tag," and, if she knew that he was not being
dishonest in doing so, it might be a different story. Id. Under this scenario, a jury could find that
Thompson withheld information that Brewer did not act in a dishonest manner, thus influencing
Brewer's termination. Id.
244. Id. (citing the Seventh Circuit's position in Rozskowiak v. Viii. of Arlington Heights,
415 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2005)).
245. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 918.
246. Id. (citing Byrd v. 11. Dep't of Pub. Health, 423 F.3d 696, 708 (7th Cir. 2005); Willis v.
Marion Cty. Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (1997)).
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considers both stories." 24 7 In Brewer's case, the court determined that
such an independent investigation occurred when Hendricks personally
examined the parking tag at issue and saw for herself that Brewer
altered it. 24 8 Moreover, Hendricks had no responsibility to contemplate
that Thompson withheld information from her because, according to the
court, "Brewer never claimed that Thompson was holding anything
back.- 24 9 Given this independent investigation and that Hendricks
terminated Brewer for misconduct, Thompson's racial animus did not
singularly influence the employment action and could not be imputed to
2 50
the University.
Finally, the court clarified its position regarding subordinate bias
liability, noting that its "approach to Title VII cases involving an
employee's influence over a decision maker has not always been
completely clear." 25 1 The court explained that its prior cases should not
be construed to permit "significant influence" or "any influence" as
sufficient to impose liability on an employer, calling the dicta
"doubtful" and "at odds with numerous cases." 2 52 While the Brewer
court did not explicitly adopt the actual decisionmaker standard, its use
of terms nearly identical to those used by the Fourth Circuit in Hill"actual decisionmaker" and "principally responsible"--certainly draw

247. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 918. The court urged that independent investigations make sense
given the practical realities of business and employment decisions. Id. at 920. Furthermore, the
investigations should be seen from the view of Title VIl's objectives, which is not to provide
redress, but to give employers an incentive to keep their employees' behavior in check. Id. With
that understanding, only acts that an employer could reasonably prevent should be allowed to
impose liability. Id.
248. Id. at 919.
249. Id. It is difficult to understand the court's finding that Brewer never claimed Thompson
withheld information, seeing as earlier in the opinion, the court wrote, "Brewer told Hendricks
that Thompson gave him permission to park in the C8 lot. He also said that Thompson could not
be trusted to confirm this because she was a racist and wanted him fired .
I..."
Id. at 913, 919.
While these facts are certainly disputed, the court's finding that Brewer never informed
Hendricks that Thompson omitted information seems to be taking facts in the University's favor
rather than Brewer's. In fact, the court stated that the University investigated all of Brewer's
claims, "including all arguments Brewer made to the University that his mistake was innocent
(according to Hendricks's account, he made none)." Id. at 921 (emphasis added). The court
implies that, had Hendricks known that Thompson withheld information from her, Hendricks
would have had an obligation to further investigate. Id. at 919. Therefore, given Brewer's
assertion that he did provide Hendricks with such information, it appears that the facts, taken in
Brewer's favor, demonstrate that Hendricks did not perform a sufficient independent
investigation. Id.
250. Id. at919.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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into question the Seventh Circuit's position on the subordinate bias
spectrum.

2 53

Thus, the circuit courts remain in disagreement as to the amount of
influence a biased subordinate must have on the decisionmaking process
to trigger employer liability. 25 4 Where a court falls on the spectrum of
cat's paw liability depends on that particular court's interpretation of
Title VII and what that court deems an appropriate balance between the
need for employee redress and employer protections. 2 55 This Comment

varying philosophies behind each model of
will next address the
256
subordinate liability.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Essentially, the debate surrounding the application of these models is
a normative one, depending in significant part on the courts' underlying
philosophies of employer liability. 257 Having examined cases that

illustrate the varying standards of subordinate bias liability, this section
will delve further into the philosophy behind each stream and address
the merits and disadvantages of adopting the input, 2 58 actualdecisionmaker, 2 59 and causation 260 standards.
A. The Input Model Failsto Provide an Adequate Incentivefor
Employers to Avoid Liability Because the StandardIs Unfeasible
The input standard serves as the most lenient model for cat's paw

liability by holding an employer potentially liable if a biased
subordinate "influenced" the decisionmaking process. 26 1

However,

253. Compare Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th Cir.
2004) (using terms such as "actual decisionmaker" and one "principally responsible for"), with
Brewer, 479 F.3d at 917 (requiring that a subordinate exercise "singular influence").
254. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 21.
255. See Gesinsky & Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10 (noting that applications of subordinate
bias liability are no more than "attempt[s] to apply some form of a normative standard"); Norton,
supra note 9 (discussing the various beliefs of different groups' views on cat's paw litigation).
256. See infra Part IV (explaining why the circuits adopt the input, causation, or actualdecisionmaker models).
257. Gesinsky & Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10.
258. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how the input standard provides the best avenue for
plaintiffs, but may work contrary to the principles of Title VII by not providing employers with
an adequate method to protect themselves from liability).
259. See infra Part IV.B (noting that employers favor the actual decisionmaker approach as it
seeks to avoid strict vicarious liability, but finding that it is overly harsh and its terms do not
mirror those in Title VII).
260. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the causation model as an appropriately tailored middle
ground framework, but noting that the terms of Title VII may draw into question its accuracy).
261. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 486-87 (10th Cir. 2006), cert.
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allowing employer liability based on mere input largely ignores the
principles embodied in Title VII, such as deterring employer
misconduct. 2 62 This standard, employed by the Fifth Circuit, provides
the greatest opportunity for a plaintiff to proceed in litigating an
By only requiring that a
employment discrimination claim. 263
subordinate exert influence over a decisionmaker, the lower threshold
makes genuine issues of material fact more likely, thereby permitting
juries to assess whether discriminatory actions affected adverse
employment actions. 26 4 Support for this view may also be found in the
Some scholars argue that the 1991
language of Title VII. 26 5
amendments-which added that plaintiffs need only demonstrate that a
prohibited classification was a "motivating factor" for an employment
is required and may remove but-for
decision-suggest a lower threshold
266
causation from any determination.
Certain studies also lend support to the input standard by highlighting
the potentially pervasive influence unconscious biases have in the
workplace. 267 Investigations into the cognitive processes of suggestion
indicate that how people think-and how bias often comes about-is a
Recommendations become
matter of deep subconsciousness. 2 68
"tentative hypothes[es]," and people unconsciously seek to confirm
these recommendations in their interactions with others. 26 9 To the
granted, 127 S.Ct. 852 (2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007).
262. Id.
263. Gesinsky & Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10 (stating that the Fifth Circuit "seemingly
espoused in Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture the most pro-plaintiff standard"); Coyle, supra
note 51, at 25; see also Julie Miller, High Court to Hear 'Cat's Paw' Liability Case, INSIDE
COUNSEL, Apr. 2007, available at http://www.insidecounsel.com /section/litigation/1042 (noting
that the Fifth Circuit stands on the "employee-friendly" end of the subordinate bias spectrum).
264. Genova & Vemoia, supra note 12, at 21. Where this standard applies, a plaintiff may
merely attempt to show that a prohibited trait was given any consideration by an ultimate
decisionmaker or HR official. Needle, supra note 185, at 53-54.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
266. White & Krieger, supra note 45, at 504-05; see also Brewer Petition, supra note 8, at 25
("The 1991 amendment makes it explicit that an employer may be found liable when it or its
agents use race as afactor in making an employment decision.").
267. White & Krieger, supra note 45, at 499. Though White and Krieger ultimately argue for
a causation-based approach, their insights into unconscious discrimination help highlight that
perhaps a more lenient standard is necessary to adequately reflect the complexity of modem
discrimination. See also Green, supra note 5, at 379 (discussing social science research that
employers "filter information to confirm a hypothesis").
268. Id. at 499.
269. See White & Krieger, supra note 45, at 524 (noting that courts often assume that
decisionmakers who receive recommendations and then conduct an investigation of their own
"approach[] the decision de novo," but that "[c]ognitive social psychology teaches that this is not
a reasonable assumption") Further, recommendations "tend to function as a prior theory-a
tentative hypothesis" and "can reasonably be expected to influence the ultimate decision maker's
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extent that biases may be filtered through the workplace on an
undetected, subconscious level, the lower "influence" standard for
establishing discrimination makes sense if a plaintiff can prove such
leverage. 2 70 Though not necessarily advocating for the lenient standard,
some employment lawyers have stated that because unlawful
motivations taint the decisionmaking process, the decision itself is
simply unlawful. 2 7 1 Simply because other non-biased participants may
have also been part of a decision cannot reverse the spoiled
27 2
determination.
Some legal scholars argue that as workplace boundaries diminish,

unconscious biases create issues that current discrimination statutes
simply cannot address. 273 These scholars contend that the nature of the

modem, flexible workforce and disapproval of overt discrimination
makes bias operate at multiple stages of employment, not in singular

concrete instances. 274 Employers structure their companies to allocate
work and responsibility as they deem efficient. 275 Those structural
2 76
decisions inevitably influence how employment decisions are made.

Procedures in the workplace or the general work culture may influence
judgment in a recommendation-consistent direction, even if he conducts his own investigation."
Id. White & Krieger provide as an example the statement, "Mary is a poor performer and should
be fired," and argue that a decisionmaker who hears this comment will tend to seek information
that confirms this statement or interpret information as confirming it. Id. at 525-26. See also
Recent Cases, supra note 5, at 1704 ("When anchored to a presupposition of guilt, the
decisionmaker may conduct the investigation in a manner tending to uncover evidence that
confirms the expectation created by the supervisor.").
270. See Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 3 (by inference, if biased opinions consistently fly below
the radar in the workplace, then requiring a lower influence threshold may make sense to best
address the current realities of discrimination). Simply by "spinning" facts in a way reflecting
their bias, an employee can exert influence. White & Krieger, supra note 45, at 515.
271. Coyle, supra note 51, at 25.
272. Id.
273. Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 3; Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as
Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 850 (2007);
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 461 (2001).
274. Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 13; Sturm, supra note 273, at 469. For instance, the Implicit
Association Test (IAT), which "measures differences in the speed of cognitive processing in
order to identify biases not found in response to explicit questioning," indicates that there is a
"substantial dissociation between explicit and implicit beliefs and attitudes regarding race and
sex."
Green, supra note 273, at 855.
The IAT test may be viewed at
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/.
A recent study also found that resumes with whitesounding names had a fifty percent better chance of receiving a call-back than African-American
sounding names. Id. at 856. These studies indicate that modem-day biases are more covert, and
represent unique challenges to current employment discrimination law.
275. See Klein, supra note 6, at 46-47 (discussing workplace structural changes implemented
by employers to increase efficiency).
276. Green, supra note 273, at 890.
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the amount of unconscious discrimination. 2 77 In response, the legal
system must find a way to address biases that develop because of a
company's organization. 27 8 To the extent that an employer uses
committees or lower-level personnel to make employment decisions, it
is reasonable to argue that the law should recognize the potential for a
biased employee to affect the process .279
Further supporting the philosophy underlying the input standard is
the general understanding of power. 2 80 As argued by the plaintiff in
Russell in her brief to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
Power is a perception, an idea . . . . Actual power within an
organization does not depend on some chart created by [a] wellmeaning corporate bureaucrat. Actual power within an organization
depends in large part on the relationship of the individuals within the
organization and their perception
of the power of other individuals
28 1
within the organization.
Recognizing the influence that power may have on employment
structures not only calls into question the value of the actual
decisionmaker standard, as discussed in Part IV.B, 28 2 but also highlights
the advantages of a more lenient standard.2 8 3
Nonetheless, many circuits reject this model as overly tolerant of
plaintiffs' accusations of discrimination. 2 84 Permitting a "weak" or
"peripheral" relationship to impute liability to an employer eliminates
causation-a significant aspect included in Title VI-and has no
deterrent effect on employers. 2 85 Arguably then, even if an employer
277. Id. at 856-57. Some social science research also indicates that the race of an authority
figure may influence the bias in subordinates. Id. at 856.
278. See id. at 850 (noting that Title VII is "fall[ing] short" of addressing present
discrimination problems in the workplace).
279. Green, supra note 273, at 856-57; White & Krieger, supra note 45, at 538.
280. Russell Brief, supra note 72, at 20-21.
281. Id.
282. See infra Part IV.B (discussing that by using the actual decisionmaker standard, courts
will not move toward establishing strict vicarious liability for employers).
283. See Russell Brief, supra note 72, at 21 (arguing that the jury had ample evidence to
determine that Ciulla, the subordinate, had such power to make or influence the termination
decision).
284. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 486-87 (10th Cir. 2006)
(calling influence or input standards "weak"), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007), cert.
dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007); Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,
291 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding no precedent that would allow an employer to be liable for the acts of
an employee simply because they influenced a decision).
285. BCI, 450 F.3d at 486-87. Under this view, the court argued that employers would be
punished "for any 'input'-no matter how minor . . . even where an employer has diligently
conducted an independent investigation." Id. at 487. It has been argued that the lenient standard
serves to disserve the very aims of Title VII:
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made a full inquiry and found a valid reason for terminating an
employee, that employee could still pursue a discrimination claim if she
demonstrated that her racist supervisor had some degree of influence on
the process. 286 Because Title VII was designed in part to give
employers incentives to implement anti-discrimination and antiharassment mechanisms, allowing claims to progress regardless of an
employer's preventative measures would seem to undercut these
aims.2 87 From a policy perspective, a balance must be struck between
the difficult evidentiary hurdles facing plaintiffs and the danger of
2 88
holding employers liable for actions of non-authoritative employees.

Under this standard, if employees can move forward merely by
demonstrating that a subordinate influenced an adverse employment
2 89
action, employers can be constantly bombarded with costly litigation.
B. The Actual Decisionmaker StandardIs Contrary to the Terms of
Title VII and Imposes Too High a Thresholdfor Liability
At the opposite end of the subordinate liability spectrum, proponents
of the actual decisionmaker standard rely on Supreme Court precedent
from other Title VII cases to support their view that an employer should
only be liable for acts of a subordinate employee when that employee
was "principally responsible" for, or the actual decisionmaker in, an
adverse employment action. 290 Citing the Court's analyses in Reeves v.
Because the lenient standard allows employees to recover even if an employer has
complied with Title VII, the employer's incentive to aggressively identify and
eliminate discrimination through responsible company policies and structure is
significantly diminished. Such a result is directly contrary to the objectives of Title
VII. Courts should not endorse any standard of imputing liability that creates such a
paradox, because to do so would cause severe detriment to employers and employees
alike.
The Legal Scoop Blog, Circuit Split: Cat's Paw Liability, Jan. 29, 2008,
http://www.thelegalscoop.comlegalscoopblog/2008/l/29/circuit-split-cats-paw-liability.html.
286. See BCI, 450 F.3d at 486-87.
287. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 920 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 357 (2007) (noting Title VIl's history and stating that "[i]mposing liability for employee
wrongs that an employer could not practically prevent (that is, could prevent only with
prohibitive expense or through unreasonable efforts) would not induce employers to impose
additional controls on its employees and would therefore not be effective to avoid any harm").
288. See Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at 22-25 (arguing that the Tenth
Circuit assumed vicarious liability and would "automatically impose[] vicarious liability on an
employer once causation is established").
289. See Coyle, supra note 5 1, at 25 (quoting BCI attorneys criticizing the causation standard,
but stating that so many employees "influence" the decisionmaking process that litigation would
be "boundless").
290. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Hill v. Lockheed Martin
Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1443), 2004 WL 1243067
[hereinafter Lockheed Brief].
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Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. and Ellerth, advocates contend that
the Court favors liability where sufficient evidence exists to
demonstrate that the subordinate was essentially the person making the
29 1
adverse decision.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to explicitly examine the cat's
paw doctrine, its past decisions may shed light on the limitations it
would impose. 29 2 Past use of causation and agency principles in
employment cases may indicate that even with regard to subordinates,
cat's paw liability may only extend to certain subordinates who fall
under the typical conception of an "agent." 29 3 By including agency in
the standard, even if a plaintiff demonstrates that another employee
caused an adverse employment action through his discriminatory
animus, the employer will not be liable unless that employee exercised
294
sufficient authority to be deemed an agent.
As support for inclusion of agency principles, some argue that
Congress' qualification of employer to include "'any agent of the
employer,' 295 surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of
employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held
responsible." 2 96 Though the Restatement of Agency states that an
agent's acts outside the scope of employment will not bring liability
unless he was "aided ...by the existence of the agency relation," 297 the
exact contours of this standard are uncertain. 29 8 Those in favor of the

291. Id. at 5--6. In Reeves, the Court determined what kind of evidence was necessary to
sustain a jury's verdict for age discrimination and whether judgment as a matter of law could
stand if the plaintiff's case used comprised only a prima facie case of discrimination and evidence
of pretext. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000). The Court ruled
that judgment as a matter of law was inappropriate, as plaintiff established his prima facie case of
discrimination and created a jury issue regarding pretext, and additionally, provided evidence that
his superior was motivated by age-based animus. Id. at 151. The plaintiff introduced evidence to
show that the superior, husband of the company's president, was the actual decisionmaker in the
firing decision. Id. at 152. The Court, however, did not discuss subordinate bias liability
explicitly.
292. See Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at 2-4 (summarizing the
argument that causation and agency are necessary under past Supreme Court jurisprudence).
293. See generally Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756-65 (1998) (evaluating
the role of agency in employment cases and Title VfI).
294. See Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at II ("Thus, for liability to be
imposed, a legal rule allowing imposition of agency-based liability is also required; and, for that
reason, even where causation exists, liability does not always lie.").
295. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
296. Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at 12 (quoting Meritor Says. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)).
297. Id. at 13 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958)).
298. Compare Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760 (noting that "most workplace tortfeasors are aided in
accomplishing their tortious objective by the existence of the agency relation," but more than the
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actual decisionmaker standard contend that the Court should be hesitant
to interpret the aided by the agency relationship standard too literally, as

"[i]t would unreasonably impose strict liability on employers for many a
frolic and detour that the employer simply cannot reasonably control or
29 9
prevent.
It is precisely this fear of virtual strict liability that causes many
advocates to favor a stricter standard.30 0 The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, as amicus curiae in support of BCI's petition to the
Supreme Court, argued that the Tenth Circuit's standard would propose
a "wholly unworkable and impracticable standard" for employers,
requiring them to invest an unreasonable amount of time to ensure
compliance. 30 1 In abandoning an inquiry into agency, the Chamber
argued that the Tenth Circuit "effectively inaugurated a regime that
automatically imposes vicarious liability on an employer once causation
30 2
is established," contrary to Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The significant problem with proponents' emphasis on agency is that
it glosses over the fact that subordinate bias liability often arises in
circumstances where supervisors, or those acting with delegated
authority,30 3 misuse their power to effectuate an adverse employment

employment relation itself is needed), with Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802
(1998) (arguing that the illustrations to the aided by the agency relation standard articulated in the
Restatement "make clear that it covers ... [cases] in which tortious conduct is made possible or
facilitated by the existence of the actual agency relationship")
299. Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at 13.
300. See id. at 2 (arguing that the EEOC "seeks to establish a strict liability regime that would
penalize employers for any acts by employees in the workplace that arguably have a factual
connection to an adverse employment action").
301. Id. at 22. This critique centered in large part on the court's discussions of independent
investigations, but the Chamber of Commerce also found that the court did not consider agency
principles properly. Id. at 22-26.
302. Id. at 24-25. As support, the Chamber of Commerce cited Faragher'sreminder that an
employer will not be automatically liable for harassment. Id. at 25 (citing Faragher,524 U.S. at
804).
303. Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at 20. The Chamber of Commerce
argues that, "there is no exercise of official delegated authority even by a direct supervisor of the
plaintiff where that supervisor's actions are not part of his official delegated duties." Id. Yet this
standard is overly harsh, as it permits a supervisor in an influential position to parlay his authority
in a prohibited manner without responsibility. As the court noted in Faragher,the aided by the
agency relation allows employers to be liable for conduct of their employees "made possible by
abuse of his supervisory authority." Faragher,524 U.S. at 802. If a supervisor or employee
lacking decisionmaking power uses his position and knowledge-say, from performance
evaluations-to further his discriminatory motivations, even though that employee is not
exercising a specifically delegated position, he is still relying on his authority in satisfying his
objective. If the employer takes the employee at his word and does not complete an independent
investigation, the employer should not be off the hook simply because the employee did not act
pursuant to an official delegated duty.
As also noted in Faragher,"When a person with
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action. 3°4 In focusing on the agency relationship, these advocates seem
to suggest that the courts are a step away from holding that any random
employee may subject an employer to liability. 30 5 Yet the Supreme
Court has noted that not all agency concepts may be adaptable to Title
VII jurisprudence, though still generally eschewing the notion of
30 6
holding employers automatically liable for the conduct of employees.
Given the principle of stare decisis, it seems reasonable to infer that the
courts are not in danger of succumbing to a strict liability standard for
employers. 30 7 Therefore, it is unnecessary to argue that the actual

supervisory authority discriminates in the terms and conditions of subordinates' employment, his
actions necessarily draw upon his superior position... " Id. at 803.
304. Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 17. See generally Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill.,
479 F.3d 908, 913-17 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing parking incident that led to Brewer's
termination, and his desire to hold the University responsible for the discriminatory conduct of
his supervisor,Thompson), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 357 (2007); EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 450 F.3d 476, 478-83 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing factual background of Peters' case
against BCI and how Peters sought to impute the discriminatory motives of his supervisor, Grado,
to BCI), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007); Hill v.
Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 282-83 (4th Cir. 2004) (Hill based her
claim on the discriminatory animus of her safety inspector, Fultz). Conversely, Russell dealt with
the discrimination of a non-supervisory employee, Ciulla, but the court found that because Ciulla
was the son of the parent company's CEO, he wielded greater authority than the typical
employee. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 225, 227-28 (5th Cir. 2000). The
Supreme Court recognized the possibility of such influence in Reeves as well, in the context of a
husband influencing his wife, the president of the company. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 152 (2000). The dissent in Hill also noted that "[b]iased subordinates
without decisionmaking authority often influence these decisions."
Hill, 354 F.3d at 299
(Michael, J., dissenting).
305. The Hill court stated:
[W]e decline to endorse a construction of the discrimination statutes that would allow a
biased subordinate who has no supervisory or disciplinary authority and who does not
make the final or formal employment decision to become a decisionmaker simply
because he had a substantial influence on the ultimate decision or because he has
played a role, even a significant one, in the adverse employment decision.
Hill, 354 F.3d at 291; see also Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at 24-25
(arguing that the Tenth Circuit is imposing vicarious liability on an employer simply based on
causation).
306. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803-04; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY.
Introduction 8-9 (2006).
307. Faragher,524 U.S. at 804 (acknowledging that the Court is bound to follow stare decisis
and the terms outlined in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), regarding
vicarious liability). In fact, it seems that proponents of the strict standard intertwine the cat's paw
doctrine with the "rubber stamp" doctrine. BCI, 450 F.3d at 484. While the two phrases may be
used interchangeably, rubber stamp "refers to a situation in which a decisionmaker gives
perfunctory approval for an adverse employment action explicitly recommended by a biased
subordinate." Id. By finding that employers should only be liable when a subordinate serves as
the actual decisionmaker, it essentially holds that only rubber stamp situations will bring liability,
ignoring a whole line of cat's paw cases where subordinates, as cunning monkeys in the fable,
induce their employers-the cats-to burn their hands in the fire. Id. at 484, 490-93.
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decisionmaker standard is appropriate simply as a guard against
unlimited liability.
Regardless of whether cat's paw cases involve the traditional agency
relationship, they rely on the premise that the subordinate acted in a way
to effectuate an adverse employment action through discriminatory
means. 30 8 This is true despite what power the subordinate is supposed
to exercise in the official employment structure. 309 As proponents of
the actual decisionmaker model concede, adhering to this paradigm
completely ignores the fact that a subordinate caused the adverse
employment decision through his discriminatory animus. 3 10 To dismiss
an otherwise valid claim simply because the perpetrator was not vested
with the appropriate title would lead to unjust results. 3 11 To abide by a
structure that ignores causation goes against the terms of Title VII and
would allow employers to create hierarchies that would avoid liability,
even where it is proven that discrimination caused a tangible
308. See Gesinsky & Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10 (noting that plaintiffs may bring cat's paw
claims where they suffered an adverse employment action).
309. See generally supra Part III (describing the facts of representative cat's paw cases and
the relevant employment structures). Yet even in cases where a subordinate did not act pursuant
to his employment duties, such as in Russell, courts-including the Supreme Court-have
recognized that ordinary employees can exert substantial influence in certain situations to
effectuate an employment decision. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
152 (2000) (detailing how an ordinary employee wielded "absolute power" over employees
purportedly on his own level); Russell, 235 F.3d at 228-29 (discussing the level of "informal"
influence Ciulla held within the company). Typically, the analyses in these cases do not follow a
mechanical discussion of whether the subordinate at issue is an "agent" within the meaning of the
statute. See generally Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149-54 (in evaluating whether judgment as a matter of
law was appropriate, not addressing whether subordinate was an "agent"); Russell, 235 F.3d at
228-29 (stating that the evidence Russell relied on to show Ciulla influenced her termination, but
not discussing agency principles). Even Hill did not rest its holding on finding that Fultz was not
an "agent," but rather held that he did not exert enough influence to be considered the actual
decisionmaker. Hill, 354 F.3d at 297. Thus, to the extent that some proponents of a stricter
standard focus on agency, it is not necessarily an integral aspect of the actual decisionmaker
standard. See generally id. at 289-91 (while discussing agency in its holding, the court in Hill
did not proceed through any specific analysis of why Fultz was or was not an "agent"). Rarer are
cases such as Russell, where the influence of an ordinary employee is at issue. Russell, 235 F.3d
at 221.
310. Brief of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 66, at 11; Hill, 354 F.3d at 299
(Michael, J., dissenting). In essence then, under this model, a court can say to a plaintiff, "You
set out sufficient evidence that your project supervisor caused your firing through her
discriminatory motives, and, had she not acted in such a way, you would undoubtedly still have
your job, but because her specific job duties only included rating your performance, we really
can't do anything about it here." See also White & Krieger, supra note 45, at 499 (arguing that
the actual decisionmaker standard "would require a finding against the plaintiff in too many
contexts in which even conscious, deliberate discrimination by an agent of the employer, acting
within the course and scope of his employment, had caused the challenged action to be taken").
311. See Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 32 (by inference, admitting that a stricter standard
would not fulfill the purposes of Title VII).
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employment decision. 3 12 Courts acknowledge that companies' work
structures often do not mirror the decisionmaking process, 3 13 and to
take the metaphors used in these cases-cat's paws and rubber
stamps-too literally misses the purpose of these doctrines. 3 14 As the
Tenth Circuit noted in BCI, "[sitripped of their metaphors, subordinate
bias claims simply recognize that many companies separate the
decisionmaking function from the investigation and reporting functions,
and that racial bias can taint any of those functions."315
Further, a significant criticism of the actual decisionmaker standard is
that it is "at odds" with nearly every circuit as well as the language of
Title VII. 3 16 Focusing on who is the actual decisionmaker or the one
"principally responsible" for an employment decision is curious because
Title VII never discusses the term "decisionmaker," only agents of
employers. 3 17 To restrict liability to those who can be deemed actual
decisionmakers seems wholly contrary to the statutory principles at
issue.

3 18

C. The CausationStandardExemplifies Title VII and Strikes the
Appropriate Balance Between Employers and Employees
As the middle ground between two extremes, the causation standard
is an appealing model. 3 19 It effects the purposes of Title VII and
achieves a balance between the realities employers face in structuring
320
their businesses and the need for appropriate redress for plaintiffs.
312. See Russell, 235 F.3d at 227 n.13 (in discussing opinions of sister circuits, the court
commented that if it "adhered to a rigid formalistic application, employers could easily insulate
themselves from liability by ensuring that the one who performed the employment action was
isolated from the employee, thus eviscerating the spirit of the 'actual decisionmaker' guideline");
see also BCI, 450 F.3d at 486 (the importance of recognizing subordinate bias claims is that it
"forecloses a strategic option for employers who might seek to evade liability, even in the face of
rampant race discrimination among subordinates, through willful blindness as to the source of
reports and recommendations").
313. BCI, 450 F.3d at 486.
314. Id.
315. Id. at488.
316. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 299 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Michael, J., dissenting).
317. BCI, 450 F.3d at 487. In fact, the court referred to Hill's use of the decisionmaker term
as "peculiar." Id.
318. Id. As 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) mentions employers and their agents, "which in accordance
with agency law principles includes not only 'decisionmakers' but other agents whose actions,
aided by the agency relation, cause injury." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
319. See supra Parts IV.A, V.B (evaluating the merits of the input standard and actual
decisiomnaker standard).
320. See Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 32 (arguing that the causation standard "advances
the objectives of Title VII ...but also will help weed out insubstantial claims"). Nonetheless,
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The standard conforms to the statutory language of Title VII and past
jurisprudence 32 1 and uses basic tort principles as a guide, making
subordinate bias claims capable of equal application across the nation
322
rather than "parsing" court-invented metaphors and definitions.
Title VII states that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against a person "because of' race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.323 From this, courts have found that it is appropriate to consider
liability for an employer where an employee causes harm by misusing
authority. 324 Thus, from a statutory perspective alone, this middleground approach is an appropriate mechanism for evaluating
32 5
subordinate bias claims.
32 6
The causation approach is also sensible because of its universality.
Whereas assessing whether an employee is an "actual decisionmaker,"
"functional decisionmaker," one "principally responsible for," or one
who "influenced" an action is a function of semantics, causation
32 7
principles are well-defined and widely understood by the courts.

Fowler argues the approach by the Tenth Circuit "should give any employer pause, because it
presents the very real danger that an employer may be liable for a bigoted subordinate even
though the ultimate decisionmaker is completely innocent." Fowler, supra note 9, at 46. Surely,
an employer should be cautious, but as Fowler notes, this approach does provide a mechanism by
which an employer, vigilant in its investigations, may avoid liability. Id.
321. BC!, 450 F.3d at 487-88 (discussing how causation agrees with the agency principles
and citing employment discrimination cases where the Supreme Court used causation). See also
Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 31-32 (providing additional examples of the Supreme Court's
,1
use of causation in Title VII cases).
322. See Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 32 (advocating that "[t]he causation standard of
tort provides a well-known and workable standard for determining when an employer may be
vicariously liable"); see also Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290
(4th Cir. 2004) ("[Wle decline the opportunity to further parse the varying applications of the
cat's paw or rubber stamp theory as employed by our sister circuits.").
323. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000) (emphasis added).
324. See Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 30 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 807 (1998) and Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998), as
supporting an inquiry into causation).
325. As the Supreme Court has stated, where a statute is "clear and unambiguous," its intent
must be given full effect. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 282 (1988). For an
additional discussion of the merits of the Tenth Circuit's approach, see Taran S. Kaler,
Controlling the Cat's Paw: Circuit Split Concerning the Level of Control a Biased Subordinate
Must Exert Over the Formal Decisionmaker's Choice to Terminate, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1069, 1092 (2008).
326. Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 32.
327. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290 (4th Cir. 2004),
(declining to further parse the applications of the cat's paw doctrine); EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 486-88 (10th Cir. 2006), (discussing various terms used by the courts
to analyze cat's paw liability and finding no reason to limit situations based on the "metaphors
that imaginative lawyers and judges have developed to describe such claims"), cert. granted, 127
S. Ct. 852 (2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S.Ct. 1931 (2007); see also Davis, supra note 59, at 262
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Using established evidentiary guidelines-in the same way courts do in
cases of circumstantial evidence-fact finders can determine if
prohibited classifications caused an employment action. 3 28 Causation
provides a mechanism to root out baseless cases through the same
3 29
processes used in more typical employment discrimination cases.
The causation standard also strikes a balance between the interests of
employers and employees in that, through independent investigations,
employers may break the chain of proximate cause. 3 30 The standard
provides employers with an incentive to train supervisors appropriately
and create cogent anti-discrimination policies. 3 3 1 While some argue
3 32
that requiring such investigations would overly burden employers,
the Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that employers are in
3 33
the best position to guard against misconduct by their supervisors.
Using a model that encourages employers to check their employees
serves Title VIl's deterrent purpose better than the actual decisionmaker
standard, which allows employers to shield themselves from liability by
creating an intricate management structure. 334 Furthermore, relative to
the cost of litigating the claim, the burden that independent
33 5
investigations might impose would not be substantial.

(noting that "[t]he difference between one who is 'principally responsible' and one who is a
,substantial influence' is 'merely semantic"').
328. White & Krieger, supra note 45, at 510-11.
329. Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 32.
330. See BCI, 450 F.3d at 488 ("[T]he employer has taken care not to rely exclusively on the
say-so of the biased subordinate, and the causal link is defeated.... Employers therefore have a
powerful incentive to hear both sides of the story before taking an adverse employment action
against a member of a protected class."). For a further discussion on independent investigations,
see infra Part V.B (discussing how independent investigations should properly be utilized under
the causation standard, consistent with the spirit of Title VII).
331. See Norton, supra note 9 (noting that the Tenth Circuit's proposal in BCI seeks to
"encourage employers to select and train their supervisors carefully, thus rooting out bias and
preventing future discrimination").
332. Brief of Amici Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council and the Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and in Support of Affirmance at 7,
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (No. 01-1359).
333. The Court stated:
Recognition of employer liability when discriminatory misuse of supervisory authority
alters the terms and conditions of a victim's employment is underscored by the fact that
the employer has a greater opportunity to guard against misconduct by supervisors than
by common workers; employers have greater opportunity and incentive to screen them,
train them, and monitor their performance.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998).
334. BCI, 450 F.3d at 486; see also Norton, supra note 9 (discussing the position of the
federal government and civil rights organizations regarding the deterrence benefits of broadening
subordinate liability beyond the "actual decisionmaker" model).
335. See HRCRR, Internal Investigations,supra note 14, at 2 (noting that early investigations
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The efficacy of independent investigations nevertheless presents a
challenge to properly applying the causation model.33 6 If employers are
permitted to evade this requirement by conducting non-independent
inquiries, the utility of this model will be destroyed. 3 37 The importance
of independent investigations will be discussed in Part V.B. 3 38
V. PROPOSAL

This section proposes that the Supreme Court should consider a
subordinate bias liability case in the near future to finally resolve the
conflict between the circuits. When the Court does, it should adopt the
Tenth Circuit's causation-based approach. 33 9 In doing so, it is
imperative that the Court emphasize the necessity of meaningful
340
independent investigations to break the chain of causation.
A. The Supreme Court Should Examine a Cat's Paw Case andAdopt
the CausationModel
The Supreme Court recognized this circuit split and its importance
twice in the past three years, granting certiorari in the BCI case and

inviting the U.S. Solicitor General to file a brief in anticipation of the
Hill case. 341 Although it has yet to hear a subordinate bias case on the
can result in quickly resolving disputes, and, by inference, thereby avoiding litigation costs).
However, the Tenth Circuit indicated that simply asking an employee for his side of the story
"may defeat the inference that an employment decision was discretionary." BCI, 450 F.3d at 488.
See also Debra L. Raskin &-Jamie Ostrow, Don't Blame the Messenger: Supervisors Can Face
Discrimination Claims for Following a Biased Colleague's Advice, THE RECORDER, June 13,
2007.
336. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 24-25; see also The Legal Scoop, supra note 285
("The problem with [the Tenth Circuit's causation] standard is that the discussion quickly
digresses into a debate over the 'adequacy' of the investigation undertaken by the HR
professionals before they made their decision," and arguing that such inquiries are improper role
for the courts ... such is not the role of the court.").
337. See Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that an investigation
is not independent if the biased subordinate is involved in or had influence over the process).
338. See infra Part V.B (advocating that the Supreme Court emphasize the importance of truly
independent investigations).
339. See infra Part V.A (discussing the importance of the Court resolving the circuit split on
subordinate bias liability); see also Kaler, supra note 325, at 1090-93 (arguing that circuits
should adopt the causation standard).
340. See infra Part V.B (arguing that the causation standard best embodies the principles of
Title VII and fits the needs of both parties, but that independent investigations should be held to a
high standard).
341. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 127 S. 852 (2007), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 852
(2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S.Ct. 1931 (2007); Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc.,
542 U.S. 935, 935 (2004) (inviting Solicitor General to file a brief); Hill v. Lockheed Martin
Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 543 U.S. 1132, 1132 (2005) (dismissing petition for a writ of certiorari);
see also Brewer Petition, supra note 8, at 3 (arguing that the Court is aware of the conflict and
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merits, a number of employment lawyers predict that the Court will
soon revisit the issue. 34 2 Only then can employers and employees
nationwide have the same opportunities to defend or pursue their
claims. 34 3 Despite this need, the Supreme Court in 2007 denied
certiorari in two cat's paw cases, Brewer and Sawicki v. Morgan State
University.344 The Court's prior indication of interest in this area has
led at least one observer to construe these denials not as an
unwillingness by the Court to consider subordinate bias liability, but
345
simply a desire to wait for the right case.
Currently, without a uniform standard, similarly situated parties
receive different treatment depending on where they bring their
cases. 346 For example, if the Fifth or Third Circuit had heard Brewer,
the decision may have turned out differently. 347 Under the input
standard, the court could have found that Brewer's supervisor
"influenced" the decision to terminate him, and a jury would have been
able to hear Brewer's case. 34 8 Instead, by requiring that the biased
subordinate be the "functional decisionmaker," Brewer's claim was
34 9
defeated on summary judgment.
The exact contours of the cat's paw doctrine are also unclear among
the circuits, creating the potential for varying outcomes. 350 The Second
Circuit, for example, has a relatively undefined position on subordinate
bias liability. 35 1 As a result, recent district court cases demonstrate a
willingness to adopt a more pro-plaintiff, influence-based approach,
35 2
despite past appellate decisions indicating a more moderate position.
Additionally, in the Seventh Circuit, debate exists as to whether the
has previously deemed it worthy of recognition).
342. Hofmann, supra note 183, at 3; Gesinsky & Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10.
343. See Brewer Petition, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that the current split "inevitably leads to
irreconcilable outcomes among, and even within, the circuits").
344. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of II1., 128 S. Ct. 357 (2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
357 (2007); Sawicki v. Morgan State Univ., 170 F. App'x 271 (2007), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
2095 (2007).
345. Supreme Court's 2006-2007 Docket Resolved Some Employment Issues but Created
Others, 29 Emp. Discrimination Rep. (BNA) No. 05, at 152 (Aug. 1, 2007).
346. Brewer Petition, supra note 8, at 24. This results in great uncertainty for employers.
Fowler, supra note 9, at 46.
347. See supra Parts I.A, C.2 (discussing the input standard, and, by inference, if influence
was the necessary standard in Brewer, arguably a court could have found Brewer's claims should
survive summary judgment based on Hendricks' involvement in the parking dispute).
348. Brewer Petition, supra note 8, at 23-24.
349. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 909.
350. Gesinsky & Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10.
351. Id.
352. Id.
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recent Brewer decision was a significant departure from past
decisions. 35 3 In opposition to Brewer's petition to the Supreme Court,
the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois argued that the
Seventh Circuit's decision was in fact consistent with its previous
holdings in cat's paw cases. 354 It argued that "influence" and "cause"
were synonymous terms, each only requiring an investigation of
whether a biased subordinate's conduct "result[s] in a tangible
employment action." 355 This argument is tenuous given the plethora of

scholarship identifying that causation and influence are indeed different
in this context. But it highlights that, in light of Brewer, the scope of
356
the Seventh Circuit's current approach is hazy.
The Court's ruling would also have a significant impact on

employee-plaintiffs facing summary judgment, and on employers'
human resources decisions. 3 57 The increasingly flexible corporate
structures vest more decisionmaking power in lower-level employees,
and with different standards of subordinate bias liability among the

circuits, it is difficult for a corporation doing business in many
jurisdictions to appropriately tailor its personnel policies. 358 For the
large number of employers who centralize employment decisions and
delegate upper-level management to make determinations based on the
recommendations of subordinates, a decision by the Supreme Court is
359
necessary and important.

353. Brief for Respondent In Opposition To Petition at 17, Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ.
of Ill.,
479 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1694) [hereinafter Board of Trustees Brief].
354. Id. at 6.
355. Id. at 7.
356. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 487-88 (10th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the various circuits' approaches and specifically expressing disapproval for the Fifth
Circuit's "influence" standard, distinct from its causation approach), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 852
(2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S.Ct. 1931 (2007); Board of Trustees Brief, supra note 353, at 14-15
(arguing that the Seventh Circuit's approach in Brewer was consistent with its precedent and
other circuits).
357. Board of Trustees Brief, supra note 353, at 14-15; Miller, supra note 263 (quoting Todd
Presnell, an attorney who was to represent BCI before the Supreme Court). See also Genova &
Vernoia, supra note 12, at 22 (stating that the Supreme Court's decision in BCl was expected to
have a "profound impact" on subordinate bias liability).
358. Brewer Petition, supra note 8, at 26. This uncertainty is particularly important to
termination decisions:
The most significant effect of these decisions comes in how employers carry out their
business decisions with respect to terminations. If the employers work in a circuit
where courts interpret the law much like the Fourth Circuit, employers may make all of
their decisions through committees who thus insulate the company from liability ....
Davis, supra note 59, at 248.
359. Norton, supra note 9; Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 24.
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Some attorneys contend that the current composition of the Supreme
Court has assumed a pro-employer stance, taking "an axe to the sea of
protections afforded by Title VII ...and greatly restricting employees'
rights to seek redress." 360 While it is impossible to predict how the
Court would rule on a cat's paw case, it should find in accord with the
Tenth Circuit in EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company.3 6 1 The
causation approach, as previously discussed, provides the most cogently
articulated standard for addressing subordinate bias claims. 36 2 In
contrast, the input and actual decisionmaker models leave the lower
courts to wrestle with relatively undefined terms in evaluating important
discrimination claims. 363 The causation model also strikes a balance
between the pitfalls of an overly ambiguous guide and an excessively
specific formula, as causation requires definitive components, but each
component also mandates a factual inquiry. 3 64
This balance is
important. Ambiguous rules run the risk of engendering uncertainty in
the workplace, motivating employers to merely make gestures of

360. Lisa J. Banks & Debra S. Katz, The Legacy of 'Ledbetter', NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 2007. at
13, 14 (arguing that the Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S.Ct.
2162 (2007), "imposed a significant limitation on workplace protections for victims of
discriminatory pay"). In Ledbetter, a pay discrimination case, the Court restricted employees'
abilities to challenge allegedly discriminatory pay structures, finding that employees must
challenge a pay decision within 180 days of when the pay decision was first made. Green, supra
note 5, at 353. Because most employees may not be aware that their salaries are different from
their co-workers, or may only think to challenge a wage disparity when it has accumulated to a
significant difference, this ruling created a large hurdle for potential plaintiffs seeking to
challenge their pay. Id. Green contends that this decision reflects "a much deeper and more
potentially devastating conceptual shift" in employment discrimination law, what she refers to as
"insular individualism." Id. at 354. Insular individualism is "the belief that discrimination can be
reduced to the action of an individual decisionmaker (or group of decisionmakers) isolated from
the work environment and the employer." Id. This trend is of great relevance to the discussion of
subordinate bias liability, as the actual decisionmaker approach belies a great separation between
the conduct of an employee and employer.
361. See Green, supra note 5, at 370-71 (arguing that although the Court might be "tempted"
to rule alongside the Fourth Circuit's actual decisionmaker standard, it will more likely find in
accord with the Tenth Circuit's causation standard).
362. See supra Part IV.C (discussing how causation conforms with the provisions in Title VII
while using well-known tort principles as a guide).
363. See supra note 317 and accompanying text (noting the various terms used to analyze
cat's paw claims and court's disdain for their myriad applications).
364. Establishing causation requires a finding of both "but-for" cause (the action would not
have occurred without the subordinate's conduct) and proximate cause (the subordinate's conduct
"must not be so insignificant as to make it unreasonable to treat the actor as responsible for the
harm," and be substantial). Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 30-31 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1977)). Because each prong has its own separate formulas, it
provides a workable yet flexible standard.
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standard could not
compliance. 36 5 In contrast, an overly specific
"neatly adapt to variable and fluid contexts." 366
B. In Adopting the CausationModel, the Supreme Court Must
Emphasize the Importance of Truly Independent Investigations

One of the most attractive features of the causation model is that it
provides a relatively simple way for employers to avoid liability:
conduct an independent investigation. 367 By not relying on the
information of one (potentially biased) source and by taking steps to
understand all sides of a situation before making a tangible employment
36 8
decision, an employer breaks the chain of proximate causation.
Indeed, the BCI court noted9 that perhaps merely hearing both sides of a
36
story would be sufficient.
Yet what it means to conduct a truly independent investigation must
be clarified. The level of investigation sufficient to shield an employer

from liability is uncertain, and is an essential question for the Supreme
Court to address in the future. 370 In the present system, courts could
easily be satisfied when an employer complies on paper. 37 1 However,
cursory acceptance of an employer's compliance on paper would not
necessarily examine whether the policies or procedures used were
effective, and this does not fulfill the purpose of Title VII: avoiding
3 72
harm from workplace discrimination.

365. For example, "[aiccepting a wide range of causation-breaking activity" would promote
the idea that employers are mere "innocent bystanders to discrimination," and that they need not
change their work cultures and organization. Green, supra note 5, at 371-72.
366. Sturm, supra note 273, at 461.
367. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,
127 S. Ct. 852 (2007), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007). While employers are not
necessarily required to conduct independent investigations, doing so can relieve them of liability.
Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 33. This provides an incentive to objectively evaluate claims
involving potential subordinate bias before taking action. Id.
368. BCI, 450 F.3d at 488.
369. Id. However, though hearing both sides of a story may be sufficient under some
circumstances, the Court should strive for a more meaningful policy regarding independent
investigations, not just the bare minimum. In Controlling the Cat's Paw, Taran S. Kaler argues
that, "at minimum," an employer should conduct an interview to evaluate a potential problem.
Kaler, supra note 325, at 1092-93. Yet labeling this as a "nominal requirement" underscores the
potential problem with a Supreme Court decision that does not emphasize meaningful
investigations. Without stressing this point, employers may be able to avoid liability by merely
paying lip service to the investigation requirement.
370. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 25.
371. Green, supra note 5, at 379-80.
372. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 25; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
806 (1998) (noting that the primary objective of Title Vfl is to avoid harm stemming from
employment discrimination). As Davis notes, independent investigations may merely result in a
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In Brewer, for example, the court stated that even if it were to accept
a lesser degree of influence to impute liability to the University, it
would not do so in a case like that because the decisionmaker
37 3
independently reviewed the circumstances of employee misconduct.
The "independent investigation" in Brewer consisted of Hendricks (the
decisionmaker) reviewing an altered parking tag, which served as the
impetus for Brewer's termination. 374 Yet Hendricks testified that had
she known that Thompson (her subordinate) used racist language and
told Brewer to alter the parking tag, her decision might have been
different, and would at least have led to further conversation. 375 Setting
aside the disputed facts about whether Brewer actually told Hendricks
of Thompson's racial comments, merely looking at a parking sticker
seems inadequate to serve as an "independent investigation."
Moreover, concluding that Hendrick's actions qualified as an
independent investigation is even more difficult in light of her
admission that further, easily 6obtainable knowledge might have changed
37
her decision to fire Brewer.
The Brewer court noted at great length the merits of conducting an
independent investigation, stating that in cases of misconduct, false
charges are irrelevant "so long as the decisionmaker independently
investigates the claims before acting." 377 Yet in Brewer, Hendricks
simply looked at a parking sticker; beyond that, she did not investigate
facts behind Thompson or Brewer's charges. 378 The court also properly

"revolving door" effect, "where a committee's investigation could be considered complete as long
as the committee interrogated the biased employee on his or her reasons for seeking to terminate
the protected employee." Davis, supra note 59, at 257. For courts to quickly accept compliance
on paper from an employer is closely analogous to an employer rubber-stamping the
recommendations of a biased subordinate.
373. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 917, 920-21 (7th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 357 (2007).
374. Id. at 913-14. The court noted that Hendricks "suggested that she might have changed
her mind if the alteration were an honest mistake. The jury could believe that the alteration was
an honest mistake, that Thompson knew it and that she failed to tell Hendricks. If that is the case,
Thompson had influence over Brewer's firing; if she had talked, it might not have happened." Id.
at 917.
375. Id. at 914. Brewer testified that he told Hendricks that Thompson gave him permission to
park in the lot at issue, and that Thompson was a racist. Id. at 913. Yet the court did not seem to
take this into account. See id. at 917.
376. See id. at 914 (noting that Hendricks testified that had she been told of Thompson's racist
comments, she would have taken it very seriously).
377. Id. at 920.
378. Id. at 914. According to her testimony, "[Hendricks] decided to fire Brewer after
inspecting the tag and verifying the addition for herself. She did not talk to Brewer before
reaching her decision and in fact never talked to him about the parking fiasco at all." Id.
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noted that in many cases, evidence comes from competing statements,
"a model 'swearing contest."' 3 79 It stated that
[t]he best way the courts can find to deal with such puzzles is to
empanel a jury and hope for the best; it might be too demanding to
expect an employer to do more than have an employee conduct a fairminded, independent investigation into the available evidence and
380
then make a decision in good faith.
This is a laudable statement, yet it is not what occurred in Brewer's
case. 38 1 When the very issue in a termination involves why a parking
tag was altered, merely looking at the tag does not constitute an
independent investigation of the claim. 382 Simply asking for Brewer's
side of the story and then making a "decision in good faith"-as
3 83
advocated by the Tenth Circuit-would have been appropriate.
The situation in Brewer illustrates why the Supreme Court should
issue a clearly articulated statement about the importance of a
meaningful independent investigation as an avenue for employers to
avoid liability. 384 Independent investigations should only immunize
employers "when the decisionmaker consciously seeks out evidence of
the supervisor's bias and actively corrects for its effect on the
investigation and the decision." 385 Although there may be situations

379. Id. at 920.

380. Id. at 920-21.
381. Id. at 9 13-14,917.
382. The problem of this course of conduct is discussed by Tristin Green, as she argues that
"[Iitigants should search for such contextual evidence and urge courts to examine the
decisionmaking process as a whole and the culture of the workplace." Green, supra note 5, at
380.
383. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 920; EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th
Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007), cert dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007).
384. See Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 24-25 ("[A] fundamental question remains, [as
to] how many resources . . . the employer [must] use to conduct an independent investigation
). In .....
the aftermath of Brewer, courts' interpretations of proper independent investigations
may not model the spirit of what such investigations are designed to accomplish. For example, in
Tate v. Executive Management Services, Inc., the Northern District of Indiana discussed Brewer

and stated that "[iut does not matter that in a particular situation much of the information has
come from a single, potentially biased source, so long as the decision maker does not artificially
or by virtue of her role in the company limit her investigation to information from that source."
Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Srvs., Inc., No. 105-CV-47-TS, 2007 WL 1650410, at *4 (N.D. Ind.
Jun. 4, 2007). Yet this reliance on one biased source for the majority of information may result in
an inherently flawed investigation, and therefore, courts must stress greater emphasis on
obtaining information from as many diverse sources as possible. See Green, supra note 5, at
379-380 (discussing expectancy-confirmation bias and the importance of contextual
investigations).
385. Recent Cases, supra note 5, at 1703. Part of the reasoning for this goes back to the
aforementioned bias confirmation theory discussing the possibility that biased comments function
as prior theories that people seek to confirm in their subsequent investigations, limiting even the
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where an employer can only compare competing statements between
employees, the BCI court's suggestion that merely getting the other side
of a story may be sufficient does not adequately emphasize the
3 86
importance of these investigations.
To the extent possible, independent investigations may be best
conducted by asking an employee for his side of the story, gathering all
potentially relevant information, searching into a supervisor's
background, looking for the motives involved in the recommendation,
reviewing any history of biased behavior, and examining relevant
documents. 387 Employers could also, where necessary or appropriate,
3 88
interview other employees and hire outside counsel or investigators.
Objectivity lends credibility to the overall investigation, which can only
389
help an employer avoid additional problems.
Although some employers balk at the idea of having to complete
burdensome inquiries, the extent of the investigation will necessarily
depend on the facts of each case and will not always mandate a lengthy

efficacy of well-meaning independent investigations. See id.; see also generally White &
Krieger, supra note 45, at 524-25 (warning against the assumption that a decisionmaker reviews
recommendations de novo and discussing expectancy confirmation bias); Green, supra note 5, at
379 (discussing expectancy confirmation bias and arguing that, even when an employer conducts
an investigation, social science may limit the efficacy of such an investigation).
386. See Recent Cases, supra note 5, at 1706 (arguing that simply asking an employee for her
side of the story, as stated in BCI, "will not always root out the possible discriminatory motives of
the supervisor that may have influenced the independent investigation."); see also Brewer v. Bd.
of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 920 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that evidence in employment
discrimination cases often consist of "the mere say-so" of employees), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
357 (2007).
387. Recent Cases, supra note 5, at 1706; Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 26; James
Petrie, LAB. L. NEWSLErER (Mondaq Business Briefing), Aug. 13, 2006; Fowler, supra note 9,
at 46; see also supra note 382 (an examination into the overall context of a situation is optimal).
The EEOC also recommends proactive prevention methods, such as: creating a clear explanation
of prohibited conduct; giving a clearly described complaint process that provides multiple,
accessible avenues of complaint; providing assurances that the employer will protect the
confidentiality of harassment complaints to the extent possible; and instituting a complaint
process that provides a prompt, thorough, and impartial investigation. EEOC Compl. Man.
(CCH) § 15-IX (Sept. 19, 2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/racecolor.htmI#IX.
388. Genova & Vernoia, supra note 12, at 26. Needle argues that no investigation by HR
personnel is ever neutral, "[miuch like a police department's internal investigation of an
excessive force complaint." Needle, supra note 185, at 55.
389. See HRCRR, Internal Investigations, supra note 14, at 18 ("[I]t is critical that the
investigation be viewed as independent and fair .... the validity of the investigation process will
often provide a powerful defense tactic for the firm's lawyers. In this regard, in cases in which
the determining factor is the motivation of the employer in taking a particular employment action
(i.e. discrimination and/or whistleblowing cases), a well developed, independent, investigation
process can provide powerful evidence of good faith.").

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

investigation. 390 Despite costs, employers stand to gain many benefits
from conducting thorough investigations-benefits that may have
unquantifiable value. 39 1 Employers may discover new information
through their inquiries to help alleviate future problems. Through this
knowledge employers can tailor training programs to avoid similar
mistakes in the future. 39 2 Moreover, early discovery of a problem may
help employers learn of potential problems and avoid mandatory
disclosure of a lawsuit to the public. 39 3 Finally, holding employers to a
standard of meaningful independent investigations simply furthers the
underlying purpose of Title VII: eliminating discrimination in
394
employment decisions.
A reexamination of proximate causation also emphasizes why truly

independent investigations are important to maintaining consistency
with this tort principle. 39 5 In his famous dissent in Palsgrafv. Long
Island R.R. Co., Justice Andrews wrote that in dealing with proximate
cause courts should look to whether "there was a natural and continuous
sequence between cause and effect. Was the one a substantial factor in
producing the other? Was there a direct connection between them,
without too many intervening causes? Is the effect of cause on result not
too attenuated? ' 396 If a purported independent investigation is so

390. Miller, supra note 263; Gesinsky & Lipsky, supra note 102, at 10; see also Genova &
Vernoia, supra note 12, at 13 (noting that in employment law, the specific facts of each case
determine the outcome). If, for example, Brewer complained to Hendricks that Thompson was a
racist and had was seeking to fire him, the appropriate conduct for Hendricks would likely require
taking reasonable steps to investigate Brewer's assertion-such as asking him further questions,
speaking with Thompson, or interviewing other employees in the PSO office, and documenting
the findings. If, after such investigation, Hendricks decided that the parking tag alteration indeed
warranted termination, or there was insufficient evidence to find that Thompson acted in a racist
manner, then a full and fair investigation took place. Given that Brewer's alleged misconduct
was tied so closely to the alleged discrimination of Thompson, merely looking at the parking
sticker to confirm Brewer altered it seems to evade the spirit of requiring an independent
investigation.
391. Terwilliger, supra note 15, at 12 (noting that proper investigations can be "a valuable
opportunity to enhance a company's reputation," and the opportunity to learn from investigations
and establish remedial measures may mitigate the risk of future problems).
392. Id. at 13.
393.

See HRCRR, Internal Investigations, supra note 14, at 25 (discussing mandatory

disclosures of lawsuits in financial statements for publicly traded companies).
394. Recent Cases, supra note 5, at 1706. For a general discussion on the potential pitfalls of
a lax policy regarding independent investigations, see Needle, supra note 185, at 52 (arguing that
HR departments can easily conduct "so-called independent investigations" that evade the spirit of
true objectivity).
395. See Needle, supra note 185, at 56 (discussing considerations in determining superseding
causes under traditional proximate cause analyses in tort law).
396. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting). For additional insight into proximate cause and Palsgraf,see Joseph W. Little,
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cursory that it does not break the connection between a subordinate's
bias and a termination decision, then the discriminatory conduct
remains the proximate cause of the employment decision and the
employer should not be relieved of liability under the causation
model. 397 Thus, the relevant inquiry in determining the validity of an
investigation is whether, based on the investigation, the biased
subordinate's conduct remained "a substantial factor leading to the
39 8
tangible employment action."
By holding employers to a meaningful standard in conducting their
investigations and not merely permitting cursory gestures to suffice,
both employer and employee interests are served under the causation
model. 399 As the EEOC has argued in its brief to the Supreme Court,
"[lthe more thorough, balanced, and truly independent the investigation,
the more likely the termination will be the result of the investigation
40 0
rather than the discriminatory input.
Thus, in the near future, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to
a case addressing subordinate bias liability and find that the causation
standard is the appropriate way to analyze these claims, while
emphasizing the importance of meaningful independent investigations.
VI. CONCLUSION

Subordinate bias liability presents a challenging dilemma to the
courts. It necessitates a balance between employers-who should be
able to conduct their operations with a reasonable degree of certaintyand employees-who must be provided with a meaningful method of
redress for discrimination.
As corporate structures change and
personnel directors have the power to make decisions affecting offices
several time zones away, so too must legal doctrines expand to reflect
these modifications. Discrimination is no longer an overt practice; it
Palsgraf Revisited (Again), 6 PIERCE L. REV. 75, 75-107 (2007) (analyzing Palsgraffrom a
modem perspective and discussing the elements involved in proximate causation).
397. See Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 33 (noting that the chain of causation will be
broken when the biased subordinate's conduct "can no longer be regarded as a 'substantial factor'
in the tangible employment action").
398. Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 34-35. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the Supreme
Court's decision in Ledbetter in 2007, Green argues that the Supreme Court is likely to "accept[]
a wide range of causation-breaking activity," making it easier for an employer to evade liability.
Green, supra note 5, at 371. Such a philosophy "is consistent with the belief that employers are
largely innocent bystanders to discrimination." Id.
399. Recent Cases, supra note 5, at 1706.
400. Brief of EEOC, supra note 29, at 35; see also, Genova & Vemoia, supra note 12, at 24
(suggesting that employers who take "appropriate preventative, investigative and corrective
measures" will be protected).
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works in subtle ways and should not be permitted to hide in an intricate
corporate structure. By giving employers an incentive to thoroughly
evaluate potential claims before they become a problem, the courts can
fairly blend the interests of employer and employee. Applying the
causation standard-with the "teeth" of meaningful independent
investigations-in cat's paw cases will be a step forward in facing new
employment law challenges.

